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Editorial
Editorial Beth 5 2: 1993
The recent military take-over in Nigeria, liter 8 years of
transition to civil democracy, has aroused genuine fears for
the emergence of stable democracies in Africa. And yet the
external and internal resistance to military dictatorship in
Africa (e.g. in Nigeria and Burundi) is sufficiently a clear
signal of the maturing of the democratic ideology in the world
and in Africa.
In Nigeria, analysts have proffered reasons for the
cancellation of the June 12 1993 elections considered the
freest and fairest since the end of the colonial era. The most
potent of these reasons appears to be the ethnic bias. Power
must always remain in the hands of the northern oligarchy.
Primitive fears arising from the multi-ethnic composition of
the Nigerian state ensured the sustenance of injustice: an
inept and corrupt military dictatorship escapes from the full
weight of a merited indictment through the smoke-screen of
ethnicity. Crucial national issues like the emasculation of
democratic institutions, the reign of terror through decrees,
denial of fundamental human rights, generalized poverty and
misery exacerbated by graft and corruption unparalleled in
the history of Nigeria, are covered up in the dark coat of
regionalism and ethnicity: is my region or ethnic group better
off under a southern or a northern president?, do we have
the "better life" under a Yoruba or a Hausa president?
Protected by fears arising from regionalism and ethnicity, a
handful ot'''men under arms" , inflict military bad government
on the nation: from transitional government, to interim
national government, to provisional ruling council. Apathy
and disillusionment reign supreme among the mass of Nigeri­
ans brutalized by series of military dictatorships.
When our editorial group chose this theme - democratization
- we viewed the current process of democratization in Africa
as a kairos (a sign of the times). For us this process was a
hopeful sign for humane living in Africa: the national confer­
ence in Benin Republic had been successfully concluded with
the installation of an elected president; meaningful dialogue
had been concluded in Gabon with a view to presidential elec­
tions; an elected president had been installed in Burundi
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where ethnicism has murdered peace and justice since
independence; Nigeria was experimenting on the democratic
process; and multi-racial democracy seemed on-line in South
Africa.
These signs of hope encouraged us to commission and
search for papers that will isolate the factors which may
strengthen or impede the democratic process in contemporary
Africa. Unfortunately, these signs of hope have been damp­
ened by events in Nigeria, Burundi, Congo, and the persis­
tent chaos in Zaire. These unhappy events go to stress the
imperious necessity of democracy and the relevance of our
theme.
As an ecumenical theological association we make a contri­
bution to the democratization process through sharing ideas
so that "humane living" - the aim of the values of the chris­
tian gospel. - may: be firmly established in our lands. The
dignity of the human person, the individual rights of humans
and the rights of minority groups, as proclaimed by the
United Nations and defended by the, social teachings and
commitments of our various christian churches are best
promoted in a democratic environment. Our churches promote
and support democratic institutions, justice and peace,
becaUse these proJect and protect humane living.
In Nigkia, the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) , the
Catholic 13ishops' Conference of Nigeria (CBCN), individual
church l�d�rs and asSOciations threw their weight behind the
democrat.iC ·process as evolved in the. June 12 presidential
election. It�was an election in which ethnici.ty, regionalism,
and religious affiliation were SUbjugated to the emerging
common interest of our one nation. It 'was an election which
demonstrated the basis for peace and unity - desire for good
government; for justice, equity and peace. Nigeria is not
simply a geographical expression. However, when the military
sirens struck the seductive chords of ethnicism and projected
sectional interests our church leaders wavered. CAN decided
to cooperate with the Interim National Government (ING);
and, it appears, the top leaderShip of CAN (and CBCN) is
ready to cooperate with the new military junta which sacked
the ING. Such change of positions not oDly compromise
principles but also rob the churches of a leadership role
which is based on integrity.
')
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Christians proclaim and live Jesus' chosen ministry of
installing freedom on earth: to bring the good news to the
poor; to proclaim release to the captives and recovery of sight
to the blind, to let the oppressed go free, to proclaim the
year of the Lord's favour (Lk.4: 18-19). No amount of
political inexperience will excuse our churches from testing
their actions against Jesus' principle of social transformation.
In our world of today it is becoming more and more evident
that democratic principles favour the social ecology for the
sustenance of freedom and well-being for all poor and op­
pressed. In Nigeria, and elsewhere in Africa and the world,
politics appears to be a game of permanent interests and not
permanent principles. However, the churches must maintain
permanent principles and policies and must eschew the
opportunism and self-interest which they blame in politicians.
In other words, our church leadership may not have the moral
justification to criticize in military or civil government what
they are unable to practice in their churches.
Possibly, the lack of experience in democratic adminis­
tration within our churches may explain the lack of consisten­
cy (and zeal) in the pursuit of and support for issues of
democracy. The churches lack open juridical structures and
efficient systems of communication - all of which are essential
for a stable democracy. It is true that the church is not
simply dvil society; but its structures of governance have
been patterned on historical dvil society. In other words,
should the democratization process sweeping through Africa
not also have its impact on our churches? This may not
detract from the revelation transmitted and lived through
history. Consequently, though not of this world, the life of
freedom in the churches may challenge the many ways in
which humane living is denied to numerous sons and daugh­
ters of Africa.
This issue of our Bulletin explores the problems and
prospects of democratization in Africa. Our contributors not
only examine the negative and positive aspects of ethnicity in
nation building, they also chart patl\s for the emergence of
stable democrades based on sound principles. Broohm
analyses the problems besetting African states from the socio­
political and historical perspective. He affirms that the
problems of Africa are not economic, social or even cultural.
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They are rather rooted in the contradictory option to combine
two models of building the nation inherited from the West - the
ethnic and the contractual. This unreal ambitious choice has
led to the perversion of political power and the derogation of
individual and collective liberties. The ethnic question arises
as a sign of crisis: it is a sign of the inability of the post­
colonial state to guarantee a harmonious flourishing of
communities and individuals, and its incapacity to redress the
imbalances and inequalities introduced by colonization. Aban­
uka searches for a philosophical grounding for the emergence
of stable states in Africa which will take on board African
socio-political realities. In his view, the kinship factor is
overtaken by the interests and objectives of ethnic or multi­
ethnic communities. The identity of each human as belonging
to such a community is strengthened by participating in the
group's interests and objectives. Ijeoma traces the history of
the making of the Nigerian nation-state from colonial times to
independence. The amalgamation of ethnic nationalities and
the adoption of constitutional democracy in its Western hue
were beset with problems. In his view, the patriotism of the
pre-independence political class, who rose above cultural and
ethnic prejudice, saved the unity of the nation. negbune
underlines that there is a distinction between being in power
and being a legitimate government. Since sovereignty belongs
to the people, the government which follows the rule of law,
[as opposed to the rule by law], as enshrined in the constitu-
tion consented to by the people, has legitimacy. But a non­
constitutional, non-democratic, government may , outof grave
necessity (such as the mis-governance of a constitutional
government), seize power and be popularly acclaimed to be
'legitimate. The retention of legitimacy by any government is
dependent on the effectiveness and just action of the govern­
ment and the support and consent of the governed.
We conclude this issue with reviews of two important books
concerned with the democratization process in Africa - F.
Eboussi Boulaga's seminal work on National Conferences and
mements of Democracy produced by participants in the Farm
House Dialogue of Obasanjo. The sovereign national confer­
ence lays the foundation for a new beginning of humane and
democratic living in Africa. It takes on board attitudes or
values which are constitutive of the African; those crucial
4
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elements which the participants in Obasanjo's Farm House
Dialogue perceive as characteristic of African democracy.
Obiora Ike and Elochukwu E. Uzukwu.
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Political Power, Multiethnic Territories and
Democratic Renewal in Africa.
Nicoue K. Broohm.
Today, as yesterday, phenomena currently designated by
the titles "regionalism", "ethnic conflict" , "tribalism", "tribal
regionalism", and so on, seem to be the major and permanent
fact of social and political life in black Africa. Not that these
phenomena are proper to Africa. One meets them as much in
Europe, America or Asia. Yet nowhere do they seem as
pregnant as in the political debates and practice of the
African political classes.
This peculiarity is explained by the fact of the special
trajectory that political power took in Africa after Indepen­
dence. This turbulent trajectory makes of post-colonial
African politics - to paraphrase the eminent anthropologist,
Louis Dumont - one of the typical forms of "the sicknesses of
modern politics". It has been undermined by a triple contra­
diction: conceptual, sociological and political. The .modern
phenomenon of ethnicity and the troubles attaching to it are
the cumulative effects of these contradictions. It is in the
light of these that the democratic renewal must be understood
and the effort be made to rise above the present political
decadence.
1. The Vicious Circle.
In the evening of decolonization, the African political
powers inherited territories and a mass of diverse populations
and economic-political institutions as the colonizers had
established them. The new masters were immediately con­
fronted with a problem: what use to make of the acquired
freedom? It is a problem for all movements of liberation.
In its last phase - at the end of the second world war,
thanks to international pressures and internal resistance and
demands - the colonial regime had to jettison ballast and allow
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a certain "liberalization". This took the form of representative
institutions emerging over the continent, multiple political
parties, diverse trade-unions and a private press. All of this
hastened independence.
But what did the coming of independence mean? Was it a
starting-point for major transformations or a terminus ad
quem? The final step in the struggle for liberation or on the
contrary the beginning of a new era, a new plan for society?
The polftical elites of Africa, obsessed by the mystique of
independence and traumatized by the brutality of the shock
of colonization, was not able to furnish a coherent precise
answer to the question. Tfie vast majority adopted solutions
that were more of a flight forward than a reflected, measured
plan. The new powers ifi place settled down in their own
logic, the development of which could not promise bright
tomorrows.In fact a look back at the last quarter of a century
obliges us to take account of a catastrophiC balance sheet in
many ways. One example will suffice here. The African
continent today pours forth the greatest number of refugees,
refugees who are in many cases confusedly political and
economic.
Under the colonial yoke, the spearhead of claims was the
claim to be a nation. Independence was represented as the
end of humiliations and arbitrariness, the coming of peoples
to sovereignty. The patriotism of resistance, the resolute
maintenance of an identity denied and buffeted, was in itself
aesthetics as much as politics. And that was enough! But as
the lucid observers of wars and liberation movements main­
tain: nationalism is fine only when it is oppressed. Indepen­
dence once acquired, liberty against colonialism and imperial­
ism cannot take the place of the exclusive exercise of liberty .
Liberty has to be defined positively. The new leaders did not
only proclaim themselves to be nationalists (Father of nation,
national helmsman), they gave themselves the job 'of ensurlng
the riftless cohesion of the nation within the State. The
national State must be substituted for the colonial State. This
was an uncharted path. Historically I the State was the
instrument of the nation. As G. Burdeau has shown:
lIn all the old countries, the nation lade the State; the State vas slolly
7
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formed in minds and institutions unified by the national sentiment. In the
new State, as it appeared on the African coetinent, the State has to lake the
nation. But as the State can be born only by a national effort, the drama of
politics is bound in a vicious circle·.1
To this first difficulty was added a second, more pernicious
and evil in its consequences. It pertains to the model of nation
adopted by the African powers in the context of the time. The
history of the formation of the European nations advanced two
ideas of the nation: an "ethnic" concept, so to say, and a
contractual, elective concept. The first had recourse to the
soul of a people, to what particularized and individualized
them, to their own genius, their subconscious thought
patterns. It placed the accent on the nation as an individuat­
ed collective, an englobing totality. Doctrinairely, this
concept leads to nationalism, the exalting of the collective
identity and freedom of a people. In practice, it favours
obligatory homogeneity, unanimity.
The second idea of nation is the nation as a collection of
individuals, the fruit of a rational adhesion and free consent.
The belonging of individuals to the global collectivity does not
assign them to unchanging identity, but the contrary. Multi­
belonging is the rule in this case. The individual subject
pertains to several communities: religious, regional, linguis­
tic, ideological, and so on. He has several identities, and
they must be permanently allowed to him.
At the dawn of Independence these two ideas of nation were
in vogue already in African societies. It must be stressed that
they had undergone decisive qualitative changes. The pre­
colonial made little of the dynamism of these political unities,
which profoundly modified their state of existence and
evolution. Communities of similar origins and structures
historically might find themselves torn apart among different
concurrent hegemonies, while others who were in no way
predisposed from the start to live in common saw themselves
grouped under the same administrative and political authori­
ty. Nascent multr-par'ty systems, the introduction of new
technology, the systematization of finances and the partial
integration at least of western world economies came to be
added to these upheavals, which were already a source of
8
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destabilization and new challenges.
The inheritors of colonial power and of the State trappings
fashioned by Western powers came into this radically new
context. They opted for the ethnic model of nation, exalting
the cultural identity and authenticity rediscovered at the
same time (an apparent paradox). They gave themselves the
objective primordial task of cementing all the individualities
and solidly pressurizing the citizens to a collectivity. The
Single party and the army were put at the disposal of this
unreal. ambition. The repression and the confiscation of
individual and public liberties took place in almost all post­
colonial states. The "democratic" interlude was of short
duration. The nation, in its consent and desire to continue its
common life, lost its chance of becoming a reality. The
national affirmation, now an obsession, simply indicated
disarray, impotence, the impossibility of reconciling the
nation-less post-colonial State and the State-less ethnic
nations. To proclaim the nation, a closed organic entity, as a
value: is it not admitting the right of everyone to have "his"
nation? Why would a community that is subordinated and
frustrated not demand its own independence from the national
political "great unity"?
It seemed to be the problem of squaring the circle. African
political leaders soon abandoned the objective of national
construction for another myth - development.
2. Ethnic Groups.
2.1. Political Opportunism and the Ethnic
Group.
It is important to grasp that the origin of contemporary
Africa's sufferings is in this contradictory movement, which
is the source of the perversion of political power and of the
misuse of the State's role. Once for all the idea must be
discarded that our difficulties stem from what is economic,
social or even cultural. There must be said about Africa,
mutatis mutandis, what Rousseau proclaimed about the society
of his time: the trouble does not come so much from people as
from people "badly governed" . As contemporaryanthropology
9
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has shown 6 "our system of values determines our whole mental
.
outlook" / and decisively influences our conduct. At a far
deeper level than institutions, values bring our basic atti­
tudes towards others into play. Politics should be sustained
by ultimate values. Opportunism and ideological tinkering
have inexorable consequences in this area that are not always
calculated. In relation to the ethnic question we must take
into account the political history of these last decades
covering the colonial and post-colonial period to understand
what is at stake. I will give some examples from recent
writings, more or less in accord with the process of democra­
tization going on over the continent, to illustrate what I
mean.
We begin with the statements gathered in 1983 by research­
ers at CNRS3 under Paul Mba-Abassole, president of one of
the political organizations at present on the political scene in
Gabon, within the frame work of the recent multi-party
system of that country. To the question, "What is your
political model"? I he replied,
IThere are certain things to be noted. We see that Gabon is lade of diverse
things. There are several ethnic groups. Unfortunately this has hardly been
taken into account since independence. In Bongo's and Sivan's speeches there
is no lore Bakale or Fang, there are only Gabonese. We know well that when
one chases nature away it returns at the gallop. As far as we are concerned,
as long as the Gabonese political systel does not allow for ethnic reality
it will never work ... On this basis we understand our multi-party democra­
cy ••.• For us this is the leaning of democracy: recognizing the difference
of ethnic groups and accepting that that difference is proper and natural to
USI•4
This remark is striking. It poses problems we will analyse
further.
Let us take another quotation from the magazine 3eune
Afrique5• In it, Ola Balogun writes,
The political parties do not correspond to any deep African reality. A vital
question will be to find a way of allowing our peoples to express thelselves
on the basis of ethnic structures, since Ethnicity remains the basic factor
of political life in our States.
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I take a last example, from a publication of Francis van
Hoek, former director (until the end of 1992) of the European
Centre for Management, Politics and Development at Maastrich
(the Netherlands). He writes:
It is frightening to note how little resistance Africans offer to the very
idea of ilporting western lodels of democracy, constitution and electoral
procedures. It is vital to place the present process of delocratization into
the perspective of the lultiple African inheritance by trying to find the
right amalgal of tradition and modernization, indigenous culture and foreign
experience and thus come to truly internalized systels.6
The debate about ethnic groups within the framework of
the democratization process in African countries seems to
have no clear contours. Ethnic pluralism, recently represent­
ed by African autocrats as an impeding obstacle to instituting
democracy in Africa, is being invoked today as something that
can and should be a base for forming new States engaged in
the process of institutional and political reform. Many
observers question the validity of the Westem model of
democracy for Africa in its present condition. Many admit
that, to say the least, the solution given to the ethnic problem
- a given in all our societies - will depend the success or
failure of institutional and political renewal. What then are
these ethnic groups which are of so great importance in the
debate on democratic renewal? Do we know what we mean when
we speak of them?
2.2. Ethnic Group - an Elusive Concept.
Ethnic groups are part of those social realities which
depend on a network of evidence that disappears as soon as
one tries, however little, to examine rigorously the reality to
which it points. What is an ethnic group? When no one asks
you, you know. But when you are put the question the
certitude evaporates, difficulties begin, doubt seizes you and
confusion follows. You do not know any more. Is an ethnic
group a nation of small dimensions? Are there not as many
ethnic groups in the micro-States like Gabon, Togo, Benin,
as there are in the macro-States like Zaire, Nigeria, the
11
Nicoue K. Broohm Beth 5/2: 1993
Sudan? Who could undertake to make an exact count of the
ethnic groups south of the Sahara? 1$ an ethnic group all
those who acknowledge the same mythical origin? The same
myths are sometimes found among "different ethnic groups".
Is an. ethnic group a community of language? Those called
"Bambara" speak languages of different families - the mande
and the senufo; while the language called "Hausa" is spoken
by diverse communities spread over several States at present
- Niger, Nigeria, Cameroon, to mention a few. The ethnic
group, a paradoxical reality, is not distinguished by language
or culture or history or circumscription of space. The
definitions often given sometimes stress language, culture,
space and sometimes common descent, the consciousness of
individuals to belong to the same group, and so on. Is the
ethnic grou.p a fact of nature or of culture? A recent scientific
approach to the phenomenon prudently stated:
The concept conveyed by the phrase lethnic groupl lies somewhere between
groups which are related and the organized collectivities of the State.7
The contours and lived experience of the reality designated
as ethnic are, consequently, as fluid as the concept itself.
The history of the ethnonyms current in our young States
confirms, moreover, this fluctuation of meaning and content
of the phrase. Indeed, ethnic groups exist nowhere if one
means by that a homogeneous, permanent entity arising from
a stable combination of cultural, linguistic or other invariab-
1es. "What have always prevailed are social unities, unequal
and heterogeneous in their composition" .
8 The search for an
absolute identity of origin derives from ideological naivety or
manipulation. For all that, it is always a useless exercise.
3. The Ethnic Question Raised as a Result
of Mis-governance.
Notwithstanding the conceptual fluctuations and the
difficulties of defining the phenomenon "ethnic groups", one
fact remains constant: the facts considered are always a sign
of crisis in the African Nation-State and the power tied up
with it. Dealing with contemporary crystallizations, they
12
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denote the incapacity of the African poet-colonial State to
guarantee a harmonious flourishing of the communities and
individuals within its bosom, to redress and correct imbalanc­
es and inequalities introduced by colonization. They denote
the almost natural propensity of these States to aggravate the
imbalances and inequalities and carry them on to crisis-point.
"Tribalism" and "ethnic conflict" do not need to be satisfacto­
rily defined before they manifest themselves. They reveal a
crisis of identity that arises precisely from accumulated
unease and frustrations, from the hardships imposed by a
comfortable State on the people, who simply ask to live. The
search for identity is not the primordial activity of social
groups. Recent historical sources show that certain groups do
not even feel the need to give themselves a name. To use a
phrase of Amilcar Cabral, "People do not struggle for ideas or
things in someone else's head, they struggle to gain concrete
goods, to live better and in peace, to see their life im­
proved";" This holds at least in normal situations. In crisis,
a particular dynamic operates, entailing manoeuvres of
touching identification and readaptation. It is most important
not to make a "fetish" of the processes of solidarity that are
made and unmade in the course of the history of, one global
society. For example, enmities between sedentary commercial
communities and nomad cattle-raisers can arise according to
circumstances stronger than community or language and
culture. The feeling of belonging to a community is in itself
legitimate and normal, but it becomes perverse once it claims
a return, on the political level, to an originality that is
incomparable and untransmittable to be imposed on others.
Such claims in Europe gave rise to Hitlerism and two world
wars. In Africa it served as an alibi and a justification for
oliqarchic dictators and "obscure despotisms"; it also led to
areas of tension and wars in different parts of the continent.
It is normal to say, "Fon", "Yoruba", or "Wolof". But on the
other hand, it is dangerous to want to make an essence or
nature of these historical identifications and determinations.
This necessarily happens once one makes ethnic groups the
basis of institutional and democratic renewal. Besides, it is
contrary to the democratic spirit and idea. It is one thing to
say the new African State ought to nave support in concrete
13
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basic communities, it is another thing to say it ought to be
built on ethnic crystallizations which are supposedly a
permanent characteristic of the continent. When we are
dealing with the rights of humans and with democracy in
Africa, care must be taken not to carry differences to an
absolute point, not to exaggerate the African specificity.
Democracy is a modern invention susceptible of permitting
every society to surmount its handicaps and to progress. As
Jean-Francois Medard writes, "It is a vital necessity, for it is
the only known means to avoid political harm".
10
In Africa this presupposes redefining the State's power and
role and a positive evaluation of what Afrtcan traditions can
bring to this renewal.
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Mrican Traditional Communities And Multiethnic
States
B. Abanuka
Introduction
This paper inquires into African traditional communities
with a view to articulating its fundamental aspects. The paper
claims that a thorough investigation into African traditional
communities indicates how the individual members of a multi­
ethnic state can transform that state through se1f-under­
standing and the promotion of their common interests and
objecti.ves.
1
To eliminate any ambiguities which might becloud meaning
and blur understanding, let us clarify the chief terms of our
title.
1.1. African Traditional Community
As understood in this paper, a community is homogeneous,
that is, a group of villages (let us say between two and eight
villages) claiming descent from a common father or founder.
The homogeneity arises from kinship ties, sameness of lan­
guage, customs and laws which define their traditions as han­
ded down from generation to generation. In investigating the
community, attention will be given to those factors which
facilitate its continuity and without which the community will
diSintegrate to the detriment of its members. In addition to
underlining its African context, we shall endeavour to reach
the very foundation on which the community stands and
endures notwithstanding the mutations through which it
passes. In this regard, we shall maintain that in as much as
there is a link between the past, present and future, unless
a people is annihilated, elements of their past is contained in
the present, and these elements of the past can be employed
in view of the future.
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1.2. Multiethnic States
The concept of an ethnic group involves such concepts as
tribe, nation and race. Originally, the word tribe was used
for the political divisions or patrician orders of the Roman
State. This original meaning of the term underlies its t-echni­
cal meaning as denoting a territorially defined political unit as
opposed to the less acceptable meaning of the term as denot­
ing a primary aggregate of peoples living in a primitive or
barbarous condition under a headman or chief. Taken in its
technical sense, almost all sedentary tribal societies are
generally homogeneous in that way we conceived traditional
communities. They have kinship organization and basically
trace their origin to a common ancestor. In addition they
occupy a common territory. In this regard, such relatively
isolated and small societies as the Tallensi of Ghana, middle
range centralized states such as the Nupe of Northern Nigeria
and the Zulu of South Africa can be called tribes. Similarly
other tribal societies which lack a centralized administration
yet in terms of numerical size have the proportions of small
nations are also tribal societies. Here some examples readily
come to mind: the Somali of Northeastern Africa, the Yoruba
of Southwestern Nigeria, the Hausa of Northern Nigeria and
the Igbo of Southeastern Nigeria. It is clear that ethnicity in
so far as it means race or nation reflects more clearly these
last groups of tribal societies which are small nations. Our
paper, to the extent that it is dealing with multi-ethnic
states, concerns itself mainly with those African states that
are constituted by two or more of these tribal groups that are
small nations. In this regard, multiethnic could be considered
as synonymous with multinational. However, multiethnic
states could also be constituted by both smaller tribal groups
and big tribal groups of national dimensions.
2
2. Fundamental Aspects of the Community.
In the community conceived as the primary social or politi­
cal unit of an ethnic group, kinship and territorial consid­
erations do not always furnish the strongest arguments for
kee-ping the community together. Kinship ties are as basic and
natural as our human nature, that is, the fact that we are
17
B. Abanuka Beth 5/2: 1993.
born and that we pass away from this life. Thus, one is
constrained to look for other aspects of the community which
playa vital role in keeping the community together. We shall
consider two of these aspects of the community, namely,
common interests and objectives and the identity of the being
or reality of the individual members of the community.
2.1. Common Interests and Objectives
If we also regard the community as a close group of indi­
viduals who are held together by common interests and ob­
jectives, we discover that these common interests and
objectives are usually such that they apply with equal force
to the group as much as to its individual members. In this
respect, the maintenance of kinship and territorial ties can
even be one of the principal aims and objectives of a communi­
ty or group. The community can set itself an objective related
to preserving kinship ties, for example, encouraging mar­
riage within the community or group. Similarly, a community
might require that development projects should as much as
possible, be sited within their territory.
By defining these common interests and objectives clearly,
the community also draws a line between it and its enemies.
The enemy now is not one who does not belong to a given
community, but one who threatens the common interests and
objectives.
Hence we might consider common interests and objectives
as more fundamental than kinship ties in the actual life of the
community. In dealing with an individual who does not respect
its interests and objectives, the community or group is
prepared to sacrifice kinship considerations.
Although the community is prepared to sacrifice kinship
considerations to uphold its common interests and objectives,
it is clear that common interests and objectives do not by
themselves account for the possibility of people living and
working together as a community. For people can have com­
mon interests and objectives without being a community. In
this regard, we can have an association of scientists. They
investigate nature with a view to laying bare its laws so that
these laws could be applied in turn to control nature. Similar­
ly, we can have an association of market traders who come
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together to minimize the obstacles that stand in their way to
maximize profit. In these two examples, it is true that there
are common aims and objectives (the scientists are held
together because they investigate nature and apply its laws,
the traders are united in looking for ways to maximize profit) ,
but each member of the group, if he or she maintains some
bye-laws of the association, has a certain freedom in the
manner in which he or she pursues the common aims and
objectives. In addition, the renown or profit attained by each
individual is personal and does not usually belong to the
association as a group. On the contrary, a community is
closely bound. The community considers it interests and
objectives as overriding and the achievement of individual
members of the community belong as much to the community as
to the Indivtdual ," Hence, there must be another aspect of
living and working together in a community which is more
fundamental than the common interests and objectives. This
second and more fundamental aspect is the identity of the
being of individuals.
2.2. Identity of t�e Being of Individuals
In order to grasp the concept of identity in our context,
one must make certain ontological considerations. The first
step is to conceive the whole of reality as the totality of all
that exist and their ultimate source of support. In this
regard, the whole of reality must always exist and its contra­
diction is nothingness which is an impossibility, for it cannot
be conceived that the whole of reality can cease to be.
Similarly, the ultimate source or support of all that exists,
must always exist. Secondly, we shall conceive the whole of
reality as complex; reality as a whole manifests itself in
various levels of complexity. Hence, there is a difference in
degree of complexity of the real between a stone and vegeta­
ble I just as there is a difference between a brute that feels
and a human being who feels and thinks.
Our third step is that Y and Z, two individuals, are identi­
cal only in so far as they belong to the same level of com­
plexity of the real, and SC" they can be put in the same group.
In this case, we can say that Y is human and Z is human. In
so far as both Y and Z are human, they are identical, but in
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as much as there still exists different complexities of the real
even within the same group, they are different. For, consid­
ering the stone, there is a difference between lead and
diamond just as there is a difference between a person who is
said to be malicious and another who is said to have good
faith. Hence Y and Z are not absolutely identical, but
relatively identical in the sense that both Y and Z belong to
the same level of complexity peculiar to all things which are
said to be human and dependent on the same ultimate source.
Finally, we shall maintain that all things, A, B , C , ... , which
are identical with Y and Z are identical with one another in so
far as all are human and depend on one ultimate source.
We are now in a good position to make two conclusions con­
cerning the conditions for the existence of a community.
First, the individuals who make up the community must
possess an identical complexity of the real on account of which
they are said to be human. This is the necessary condition for
the existence of the community and shows why the community
is prepared to sacrifice kinship considerations to uphold its
common interests and objectives. Secondly, since the individ­
uals in a group which is said to be human are distinct, they
have different desires and aspirations or pursue the same
interests in different ways. Consequently, in addition to
possessing an identical complexity of the real, the individuals
in a community must have common interests and objectives.
Common interests and objectives are the sufficient conditions
for the existence of the community. This explains why the
enemy is the one who violates the community's interests and
objectives while the "foreigner", one considered as coming
from another community or group, could be the community's
member or friend because he or she favours or propagates the
community's interests and objectives.
3. Authority in the Community
Of great importance in the constitution of the community is
the question of authority or the legal power or right derived
from office. The problem that calls for attention is the origin
of this power. For, if the source of the power is not grasped
both by those who rule and those who are ruled, different
types of abuses occur. Those who rule can consider them-
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selves the very source of the power they have. Thus they can
rule as dictators or tyrants. Or the rulers may think that the
source of their power is the totality of the individuals who
make up the community. Hence, in their effort to placate or
satisfy everyone, they preside over a weak and complaining
community to say the least. If the people think that power in
the community originates from them, one could use this as a
pretext to undermine the honest initiatives which are made by
the rulers.
3.1. The Origin of Authority
The origin of authority cannot be the office which gives one
the right to rule. The office is a function created by the
community to maintain its interests and objectives. Nor is the
individual who rules the origin of authority, for he or she
exercises power only in so far as he or she is designated by
the community to preside over the reauzataon of its interests
and objectives. The very origin of authority must be sought
in the concept of ultimate reality.
Reality in its complexity has a pole of ultimacy (which is
also the pole of unity) as related to the pole of plurality or
multiplicity. This ultimate pole is the origin of all that is real
and remains ultimate notwithstanding the variations and
changes on the pole of plurality. The ultimate pole of reality
as a whole is such that in itself it possesses all the complexi­
ties of the real present in every level of reality and in all
particular things. As a result it is the pole of ultimate mean­
ing in as much as it is the ontological ground of all being. In
so far as the ultimate reality governs all being and existence,
it is the origin of all law and authority.
4
Consequently, a
proper grasp of the significance of the ultimate origin of law
and authority casts light on the nature and meaning of law
and authority as it operates on the various level of reality.
5
3.2. Authority as Accountability
In community setting, government may be in the hands of
an individual or a group of individuals. Thus a community
could be ruled by a king, chief or headman (oba, emir, eze)
or by village or town elders. We now want to examine the
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stand of the ruler(s) in relation to the ultimate reality and the
community.
The first characteristic of the ruler is consciousness of his
or her humanity and the humanity of the ruled. This first
characteristic arises from the ruler's ability to grasp the ulti­
mate origin of that humanity and the power immediately co­
nferred on him or her by the community to rule. Secondly,
the ruler realizes that both himself/herself and each and
every member of the community are distinct and each pos­
sesses different individual qualities. From this double
characteristic of the ruler arises the ruler's twofold re­
sponsibility.
First, the ruler, in so far as he or she is aware of his or
her personal qualities or possibilities, strives to work them
out to the full.. Secondly, the ruler presides over the common
interests and objectives of the community. In as much as pre­
siding over the common interests and objectives of the com­
munity involves the contribution of each member of the co­
mmunity, the ruler also presides over each member's effort to
promote the common interests and objectives.
Hence the responsible ruler is one who, aware of the ulti­
mate origin of his or her being and that of every member of
the community and convinced that both himself or herself and
the ruled belong to a certain complication of the real on
account of which they are said to be human, strives not only
to work out his or her qualities or possibilities to the full, but
also ensures that every member of the community is con­
tributing to the growth of the community's interests and ob­
jectives by working out their individual qualities or possibil­
ities to the full.
4. Continuity in the Community
The community is not static but dynamic; the community is
living and can grow larger or bigger, stronger or weaker.
Thus there is need to maintain the life of the community and
assure its continuity and proper growth. For this reason, the
community seeks for the means not only to preserve itself but
also to ensure its fuller growth. We shall now consider the
main means for ensuring continuity in the community.
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4.1. Education and Training
The first important means of assuring that the aims and
aspirations of the community are grasped and carried forward
is by education and training. By education is meant the
process by which the individual is made to attain a certain
self-understanding and an understanding of the aims and
aspirations or interests and objectives of the community.
Education is aimed at developing the individual in an integral
or holistic manner within the context of the values of the
community. TrainL�g is geared towards the sharpening of
individual talents and characteristics and the acquisition of
those skills which must playa role in individual development
and the promotion of the interests and objectives of the
community. Both educational and training processes must go
beyond the living customs and traditions of the community to
be based on the identity of the individual members of the
community in so far as they share a common humanity which
is founded in an ultimate source. Moreover those topics and
skills which will furnish the materials for education and
training must also go beyond the interests and objectives of
the community to be based on a proper grasp of those laws
which govern reality in its various levels of complexity or
intensity. Hence a human being cannot be treated like a
brute, in the same vein the real differences between a brute
and a machine can be grasped.
4.2. Community at Work
rrhat the community is not static means that the various
interests and objectives of the community are not only
watched and constantly considered anew but also kept alive
by being maintained and diversified according to growing
needs. This means work and division of labour. This division
of labour runs the entire length and breadth of the communi­
ty; it touches the ruling body and the individuals who must
in different ways contribute to the maintenance and promotion
of the interests and objectives of the community.
Work has theoretical and actual aspects. In its theoretical
aspect, it involves a sustained effort at determining those
laws which make reality what it is. This may be done by re-
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fleeting on the laws that govern reality as is given to human
experience or by concrete investigation of the real to deter­
mine these laws. On the actual level, these laws must be
concretely applied to solve human immediate needs.
In another respect, work has positive and preventive
aspects. In a positive sense, work is geared towards the
maintenance and promotion of the interests and objectives of
the community. In this connection, work can be routine and
can break novel grounds. In its preventive sense, work seeks
to remove those things that endanger the life of the communi­
ty or the community's interests and objectives. In this
respect, readiness for war is part of work.
War is founded on the numerical distinction among individ­
ual humans; the fact that over and above their identity as
human beings each individual person has particular charac­
teristics. Just as individuals have their own characteristics,
a group of individuals united both by their identity as humans
and their peculiar interests and objectives can differ from an­
other group of individuals who are also united by their identi­
ty as humans and certain interests and objectives. Thus, war
is possible on account of differences in interests and objec­
tives but not inevitable, for all men and women are identical
in so far as they belong to a given level of the real on account
of which they are said to be human. Thus, the community will
by its very existence be persuaded of the need to prepare
itself in case there arises the need to defend its interests and
objectives.
4.3. The Community at Festivals and Cele­
brations
The administrative organ of the community is aware not
only of the importance of work in the community, but also of
the need to feast and celebrate. Feasts and celebrations are
organized around the major points touching the history of the
community or its achievements, whether these achievements
are ascribed to the community as such or to individuals. For
when individual achievement reaches the highest level it
becomes communitarian. Feasts and celebrations are moments
of joy and reflection; joy, because humans are taking a
memorial leap into the past to relive the past glories of the
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community. In this memorial sense, the glories of the past
come to life in the present and fills the community with joy
and satisfaction. Feasts and celebrations are also moments of
reflection; the memorial of the glories of the past is an
invitation to maintain the spirit that made the past glorious.
In this way also can the good of the community in the future
be assured. Reflection is vital in another sense: the past may
not have always been glorious for a community; hence,
certain celebrations can point to a past failure on the part of
the community and the need to guard against such incidents
in the future.
However, of central importance in giving a sense of
direction to the community's aims and aspirations is the
articulation of the ultimately real and hence the acquisition of
the sense of the numinous and its celebration in keeping with
human life and experience. For, if humans lose this sense of
the ultimate reality and source of all that is real and, conse­
quently I lack the spirit of worship and reverence, the very
foundation is removed from the existence of the community
and a disorientation is introduced into the community inter­
ests and objectives.
5. The Community and State
The community, as we have so far considered it, is a
primary social and political unit. It is homogenous from the
point of view of its origin, customs and traditions. Where a
community is a primary political unit of a larger ethnic group
all that has so far been said about the community applies with
equal force to the ethnic group. If the community is a primary
political unit of a multiethnic state, which is heterogeneous
from the point of view of the origin, customs and traditions of
its many ethnic groups, do the conditions for the existence of
the community also apply to the state?
5.1. Multiethnic States and the Conditions
of the Community
GOing with the state is the concept of a constitution or a
body of laws which found the state and which must be
enforced for the state to realize its immediate needs and attain
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its long term aims and objectives. On account of its heteroge­
neity, the elements common to individuals in a multiethnic
state and on which the state can stand and grow must be
sought. It is our contention that the conditions on which the
multi-ethnic state must be founded are the same as the condi­
tions for the existence of the community considered as a
primary political unit. First, the multiethnic state can be
viewed from the standpoint of the identity of the individual
members in as far as they belong to a given level. of complexi­
tyof the real on account of which they are said to be humans.
Secondly f the individual members of the state can be made to
come to accept the interests and objectives, aims and aspira­
tions of the state as common to all. Nevertheless, it could still
be asked whether the other elements involved in the life of the
community can be applicable in multiethnic States.
5.2. Organization of the life of Multi­
ethnic States.
It seems appropriate to maintain that since the community
and multiethnic states exist on the same fundamental condi­
tions, other elements of the life of the community and multi­
ethnic states will be more or less the same. However, in so far
as the community is homogeneous, and multiethnic states
heterogeneous, any difference between the life of both will
not be fundamental, but organizational. Hence, on account of
its heterogeneity, more thought and skill will go into the
operation of the machinery of a multiethnic state. For exam­
ple, questions relating to the interests and objectives of the
state must be seen as connected with the territorial claims,
history and culture of the state and must be elaborated in the
background of these by experts in the relevant disciplines
such as economics.
Education and training in the state should aim at the well­
being of the state and the individual. For the individual who
reaches proper self-understanding (which implies the
understanding of other members of the state as sharing in the
same humanity) will be better placed to contribute to the good
of the state. Only a well programmed educational and training
process can enable the individual. understand the various
cultures in the state, grasp the importance of the state's
26
African Traditional Communities and Multiethnic States
interests and objectives and strive to promote them through
dedicated work. Incentives should be given to encourage such
dedicated work. Furthermore, since feasts and celebrations
arise from the history and culture of the state, one is more
disposed not only to participate in them, but also to cherish
them, if one is properly introduced to them.
Summarily stated, at the basis of the state lies two funda­
mental principles. (1) The individual members of the state in
so far as they belong to a given complexity of reality on
account of which they are all said to be human are identical
and each strives to attain self-understanding and fulfillment.
(2) These individual members of the state accept given
interests and objectives which are therefore said to be
common, and which flow from the history and culture(s) of
the state.
These two prtnciples will. determine the other two principles
which shall be called principle of organization and principle
of conservation and growth respectively. (3) Principle of
Organization: The state is organized in such a manner that it
will be possible to take decision relating to the interests and
objectives of the state in the background of the consent of
all. 6 (4) Principle of Conservation and Growth: The state
strives to conserve itself and to grow; consequently, it seeks
to educate and train its citizens such that the interests and
objectives of the state (which do touch on the hopes and
aspirations of the individual) are maintained and promoted
through work, feasts and celebrations.
6. Conclusion
The state as has been considered in the foregoing pages is
not isolated and closed up but is bounded by other groupings
of individuals who claim the right to exist as sovereign states.
States are related to one another as individuals in a given
state are to one another. The identity of individuals in so far
as they belong to a given complexity of reality on account of
which they are said to be human holds for all the individual
members of all the states, (Hence, in principle, a world
government is possible.) However, cultural differences w.ill
influence the formulation of the interests and objectives of
each state. As a result, the interests and objectives of one
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state can militate against that of the other.
Nevertheless, the identity of individual members in all the
states in so far as they are said to be human paves the way
for dialogue between states. As a result, through cultural
and other exchanges, states can reach a meaningful under­
standing of the hopes and aspirations, interests and objec­
tives of one another. For, although differences in the
interests and objectives of states can precipitate a violent
confrontation between states, nevertheless, a deeper drive
within humans, their identity in so far as they are human,
dictates that while violent confrontation is possible between
states, it can be avoided.
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6. This principle is based on the nature of reali ty as a whole which laintains
itself through the various operations of the individuals in the different levels of
the real. In so far as particular things on the pol� of lultiplicity, lanifest the
pOler of the ultilate reality, they contribute in laintaining the whole of reality.
This is the ground of a referendul through which people are consul ted in lajor
decisions. SilUarly, it is the reason for plebisci tes. For in as luch as all
particular things contribute to the laintenance of reality as a whole, in certain
cases, this power' can be elercised by delegation, that is through elected
representatives.
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Nigeria's Path To Western Democracy 1900-1960:
A Historical Perspective
J. Okoro Ijoma
1. The Imposition of Colonial Rule on
Ethnic Nationalities.
Before the year 1900, different ethnic groups (in Nigeria) ,
estimated at over 250 in number, governed themselves in
various ways. Even within an ethnic group, there were socio­
political variations. However, the beginning of this century
saw the imposition of alien rule on a political entity called
Nigeria. Lagos became a British colony in 1861. With the new
colony as a springboard, the British administration engaged
in signing treaties of 'protection' with Yoruba rulers; and by
the end of the 19th century, much of Yorubaland had passed
to the British crown.
1
In the last quarter of the 19th century, similar pressures
were piled-on B'enin and the Niger delta states, and by 1897
Benin had lost its independence.
2
In the Niger delta, power­
ful kings lost their kingdoms - Jaja in 1887, Nana in 1894,
3
and Koko of Brass in 1895. The Efik chiefs also lost their
chiefdoms with the establishment of the Oil Rivers Protector­
ate in 1885 and Niger Coast Protectorate in 1893. The British
invasion of Arochukwu (1901-2) opened the way for the attack
on other IgOO communities.
British presence in the North was marked by the appoint­
ment, in 1867, of a consul who was stationed at Lokoja. The
last two or three decades of the 19th century saw the signing
of spurious treaties with the local rulers. However, by 1899
the relations between the British administration and the
Sakato Caliphate had so degenerated that the British were
engaged in the first decade of the 20th century trying to
subdue the Caliphate, the emirate of Gwandu and Borno
Kingdom.
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The Charter granted to the Royal Niger Company in 1886 to
administer the British territories, a vague area called the
Niger regions, was revoked on December 31, 1899. The
British government had discovered that a company whose
interest was primarily commercial was certainly ill-equipped
to administer the Protectorates. In 1906 the Colony of Lagos
and the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria were merged under
one administration. From 1906 until the amalgamation in 1914,
there were two administrations - one for the South and the
other for the North.
2. The Displacement of Traditional Insti­
tutions by Colonial Administration.
The aim of this paper is to briefly sketch the process and
experience of democracy in the geographical area called
Nigeria during the first 60 years of this century. The period
1906-12, which preceded the amalgamation, marked 'both the
beginning of effective colonial administration and the begin­
ning of the rejection of standards and customs that had
endured for many centuries. It was the first time that
Nigerians were subjected in any large measure to Western
Influences, which in the next fifty years were to have a great
effect on the Nigerian society. Christianity, the official
religion of the colonial masters, began to spread throughout
Nigeria. New forms of administration and justice were intro­
duced.
From the start, the colonial government found it economi­
cally inexpedient to run two administrations. The Northern
Protectorate was run at a severe deficit, which was being met
by a subsidy from the Southern Protectorate and an annual
grant of about £3,000,000.00 from the British government.
Besides, the Northam Protectorate could only get access to
the ports through the Southern Protectorate, a different
territory. There was also the need to coordinate projects such
as the railways. The amalgamation of the two territories was
urgent and necessary for political and economic reasons.
On January 1, 1914 the two Protectorates and the Colony of
Lagos were amalgamated and a new political entity known as
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Nigeria was born. Sir Frederick Lugard became its first
Governor General, and Lagos was its capital. Directly under
the Governor-General were a Lieutenant-Governor for the
Northern Provinces (based in Zungeru), another Lieutenant­
Governor for the Southern Provinces (based in Lagos), and
an Administrator of the Colony of Lagos.
3. Indirect Rule - Key to Colonial Admin­
istration of Nigeria.
The governorship of Lugard was characterized by one
overriding administrative measure: Indirect Rule. It was
applied with modifications all over Nigeria for thirty years.
Indirect rule.' has been described as Lugard's most lasting
contrtbution to Nigeria. The policy depended for its success
on three factors: 4 a stratified society, consisting of a ruling
aristocracy and a peasantry; a degree of social immobility
preventing persons of a lower class from advancing to a
higher one; and an identity of interests between the ruling
class and the colonial power. Having successfully applied the
policy in the North, Lugard tried to work out a similar system
for the whOle country.
In prtnciple, under the system Brttish political officers
themselves were not supposed to perform executive functions.
They could intervene, indirectly, to see, where necessary,
that the Native Authority took appropriate action. They were
supposed to be advisers and superintendents who left the
day-to-day work of administration to the control of Nigerians
whose claim to authority was based on tradition. But in
reality, the white district officer was the principal executive
and judicial officer of his district.
All the three factors mentioned above appear to have
existed �o�ether in most of the emirates in the Northern
ProvinceS. In the South, it was not possible to find any two
of the factors existing together anywhere. It is true there
was a centralized authority in much of Yorubaland that could
be exploited for indirect rule. Even here there was opposi­
tion. In Iseyin (Oyo), a d'istIict head and a court judge were
murdered in 1916 I followed by riots which. were put down by
the British. A seIious opposition to the application of indirect
32
Nigeria's Path to Western Democracy 1900-1960.
rule was also manifested in Egbaland in 1918. The people tore
up the railway line and looted the stations and trains. A
number of people were killed, including a chief and one
European. Again, the British had to rush down troops and
over 500 were reported to have been killed.
In the East, indirect rule was almost impossible to apply.
The political organization in the East could not favour a
faithful application of the system. A.E. Afigbo has made a
detailed study on why the system was doomed to failure in
South-eastern Nigeria.
5
One of the fallouts was the "Aba
Women's of 1929, which engulfed much of the South-east and
led to the re-examination of the system and its subsequent
modification.
In the main, most native authorities consisted of illiterate,
conservative and autocratic chiefs. The court clerks and
judges, interpreters, messengers and a host of other officials
were corrupt, overheating, and barely literate. The young
educated members of the community were in most cases
excluded from membership of the native authority councils.
Ambitious young people outside Lagos and Calabar could not
get into the legislature. In fact the rigorous application of
indirect rule retarded constitutional growth.
4. The Nigerian Council.
The Order-in-Council made provision for the establishment
of an enlarged Executive Council and an advisory and
deliberative body known as the Nigerian Council whose
functions would be exercised in respect of the whole of
Nigeria. Lagos, however, retained its Legislative Council.
The Nigerian Council was established in 1914 with a member­
ship of 42, comprising all the members of the Executive
Council (23 white officials, 7 European and 6 Nigerian
unofficial members representing business and various
interests, and 6 other Nigerian unofficial members nominated
by the Governor-General.) .
The Order establishing the Council provided that:
No resolution passed by the Council shall �ave any legislative or
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erecattve authori ty, and the Governor shall not be requi red to
give effect to any sucb resolution unless be tbinis fit and is
authorized to do SO.6
The 6 other Nigerian representatives were 2 emirs from the
North # the Alafin of Dyo, 1 member from Lagos I 1 from
CaJ.abar, and 1 from the Warri-Benin area. The 3 chiefs were
supposed to represent the views of the masses of the people.
In any case, they very seldom attended the meetings and
when they did, they took .no part in the real deliberations.
Between 1914 and December 1920, the Council held a total of
seven meetings� Sir Hugh Clifford, Governor 1919-25,
described the Council in 1924 as a debating society in which
nobody would enter into debate. The meetings were said to be
dreary, apathetic, feeble, faint, colourless, meaningless and
wearisome.
7
5. Nationalist Feelings and the Move
Towards Constitutional Democracy.
The war years (1914-18) diverted attention from constitu­
tional and political issues to the war effort. Nigerian soldiers
were fighting the Germans in the Cameroons and in East
'Africa. The educated elite demonstrated loyalty to the British
crown by maintaining a degree of calm and peace and encour­
aging Nigerians to make Whatever contributions that were
possible to defeat Germany in order "to make democracy
safe". Soon after the end of the war, the clamour for consti­
tutional change began, particularly in Lagos. The political
class backed by the local press and some European residents
demanded a representative legislature.
The demand for a representative legislature was taken up
at the first meeting of the National Congress of British West
Africa held in Accra in 1920. Hugh Clifford who had comment­
ed on the irrelevance of· the Nigerian Council as a democratic
process I jeered at and bitterly attacked the resolution of the
Congress. He could not see
continental ligeria being represented by a handful of gentlelen
drawn frol half a dozen coast tribes - len born and bred in
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British administered towns situated on the seashore, who in the
safety of British protection have peacefully pursued their studies
under British schools in order to enable them to become ministers
of religion or learned in the laws of England. These self-appoint­
ed spokesmen of 16 million Nigerians have never penetrated into
the interior at all.
Clifford went on to say:
Assuming, therefore, for a moment that the impossible were
feasible - that this collection of self-contained and mutually
independent native states were indeed capable of being welded into
a single homogeneous nation - a deadly blow would be struck at the
very root of national self-government in Nigeria, which secures to
each separate people the right to maintain its identi ty, its
individuality and its nationality, its own chosen form of govern­
ment and the peculiar political and social institutions which have
been evolved for it by the wisdom and accumulated experience of
generations of its forebears.s
In spite of the virulent attack of the colonial administra­
tion, the Accra Conference was not all in vain. A Legislative
Council was introduced in 1922 - two years after the Confer­
ence. The Council comprised 46 members of whom 27 including
the Governor were officials, and 19 were unofficials. Like its
predecessors, the Council had an official non-Nigerian
majority. Of the unofficial minority, 15 were nominated by the
Governor, and 4 were elected. Of the elected members, Lagos
had three seats while Calabar had one. 9
The new Legislative Council was an advance of its prede­
cessors in some aspects. It made laws for the South. The laws
of the South could be applied to the North by a special
proclamation of the Governor. The Council could also debate
financial matters affecting the North as there was a common
budget for the South and North. It was also the first time in
the history of tropical Africa that Africans exercised the
franchise of electing their representatives.
10 The Legislative
Council of 1922 remained unchanged until 1945. With growing
nationalist feelings, those Nigerians who served in the
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Council were given all sorts of names as people who betrayed
the country's political future.
5.1. Political Parties.
Until the 1930s, most educated Nigerians came from Creole
or from Yoruba families that had been in long contact with
Europeans. Some had returned from either Sierra Leone or
Brazil. Between 1920 and 1922 two political parties had
emerged in Lagos - the Nigerian Democratic Party and the
Peoples' Union. The election to the new Legislative Council
was contested by the two parties. The Nigerian National
Democratic Party, under the leadership of Herbert Samuel
Macaulay (1864-1946), an engineer by profession who domi­
nated Nigerian politics for nearly forty years, won the Lagos
seats consecutively in 1923, 1924 and 1933. It also won the
triennial elections for the Lagos Town Council.
11
During the inter-war years, student bodies overseas
played important roles in arousing nationalist consciousness.
Also a significant role was played by the Nigerian Youth
Movement, founded in 1936, in the march towards democracy.
One of the features of the nationalist movement in Nigeria,
in the inter-war period, was the almost total lack of dialogue
between the British administration and the growing educated
elite. The majority of British officials, including those
responsible for the formulation of policy, believed that there
could be no such dialogue. Many British officials were
contemptuous of the educated Africans. Qualified Africans
were d.enied opportunities in the public service and industry
where the whites predominated.
12
5$2. The Repudiation of Imperialism in
Britain and America.
Crucial developments in Britain and America quickened the
pace of the constitutional process or change in the inter-war
years. The emergence of the Labour Party as an important
force in the domestic politics of Britain was one of such
stimuli. The Party asserted:
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Labonr .•.••. repudiates ilperialisl. We believe that all peoples of whatever
race have an equal right to freedol and to an equitable share in the good
things of the world.
We in Labour Party have always been conscious of the wrongs done by the white
races to the races with darker skins. We have always demanded that the
freedol that we clail for ourselves should be extended to all len. We look
for an ever-increasing leasure of self-government in Africa.13
These sentiments of the Labour Party and its radical views
helped to shape government policy towards colonial peoples
since the Party was in the coalition government of Winston
Churchill in the war years. Some other sections of the British
public and press were quick to recognize the inevitability of
independence of the British colonies and the emergence of a
Commonwealth of peoples united by a common ideal of partner­
ship in freedom.
Outside Britain, Americans had attacked colonialism and
imperialism. During the war, President Roosevelt and Prime
Minister Winston Churchill, the leaders of the Western Allies,
declared, in the famous Atlantic Charter of August 1942, the
"right of all peoples to choose the form of government under
which they will live" . Nigerians, like other colonial peoples on
the side of the Allies, interpreted the declaration to mean that
they would have the right to choose their own form of govern­
ment - independence. Indeed Dr. Azikiwe is reported to have
cabled Churchill shortly after requesting him to give official
confirmation or further clarification of the statement in order
to stimulate the African war effort on the side of the Allies. 14
The press and leaders had urged young Nigerians to enlist
in the army. They had assured the people that Nigeria's
prospects of self-government were better served under the
British than under Hitler's Germany. Nigerians were known
to have participated in the military campaigns in North and
East Africa and in Burma and India. The contacts with the
whites who did not demonstrate greater courage or valour
than Africans during cIises gave self confidence to Nigerians
asking for freedom. The economy of Nigeria also helped to
sustain the war. The colonial administration had encouraged
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the colonies to produce food and export crops. During the
war the value of import and export trade in Nigeria had
doubled. Perhaps we should mention that the Colonial Devel­
opment and welfare Fund during this period was also a factor
in the expansion of the existing economic and social founda­
tions of the country. These developments, by and large, were
not lost on Nigerians who insisted on the principle of self­
determination. 15
5.3. The Richards' Constitution.
In March 1945 there was an important development in
Nigeria's political process. The Governor-General, Sir Arthur
Richards, introduced the Constitution which took effect from
1946. The aims of the Constitution, according to the author,
were: (1) to promote the unity of Nigeria; (2) to secure
greater participation by Africans in their own affairs; (3) to
evolve a constitutional framework covering the whole of
Nigeria and a Legislative Council on which all sections of
Nigeria would be represented; (4) to create Regional Councils
in the three main sections of Nigeria - North, West & East,
each with a Chief Commissioner; (5) to forge political and
constitutional links between the native authorities and the
Legislative Council; (6) to provide for an African majority
both in the Houses of Assembly and the Legislative Council.
The new Constitution which came into effect in 1946
provided for,16 (1) the division of the country into 3 admin­
istrative Regions, namely, Northern, Eastern and Western -
each under a Chief Commissioner; (2) the establishment of an
Executive Council consisting of the Chief Secretary to the
Government of Nigeria, the Chief Commissioner of each of the
three Regions, the principal government functionaries such
as the Attorney-General, Medical Services and such other
persons appointed by the Governor on the instruction of the
Secretary of State for the Colonies; (3) a Legislative Council
consisting of the Governor, 13 ex-officio members, 3 nominat­
ed official members, 24 nominated unofficial members and 4
elected members. Of the elected members, 3 were to represent
Lagos and one to represent Calabar; (4) a House of Chiefs
and a House of Assembly for the Northern Region; and Houses
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of Assembly for each of the Eastern and Western Regions.
As soon as the constitution came into force, it stimulated
increased political activities in Lagos and other urban areas.
The first national political party - the National Council of
Nigeria and Cameroons (NCNC) - had been launched in
January 1945 with Macaulay as President and Zik as Secre­
tary. The party and the press attacked the Constitution
because, according to them, it only allowed discussion and no
genuine partidpation in the running of the affairs of the
country; it introduced regionalism and particularism in the
administration and politics of the country. It was equally
argued that the elective p:d.nciple should have gone beyond
Lagos and Calabar; and that the native authorities which
selected the Provindal Members were not really representa­
tive in character.
In 1947 the NCNC sent a delegation of 7 members under the
leadership of Zik, to protest to the British Government. It
was more or less a futile journey because the British Govern­
ment insisted that the Constitution must be tried. Besides,
the delegates quarrelled among themselves over money.
17
On the other hand, Richard's Constitution had merits. It
widened the basis of representation in the Legislative Coun­
cil. The Provindal members, although selected by the native
authorities, had direct links with the people they were chosen
to represent ," Representatives from the North and South
for the first time met in Lagos to discuss regional and national
issues that were presented to the Legislative Council and this
tended to foster a degree of national unity. The administra­
tive devolution which allowed the ·regions to handle certain
matters was a welcome development, given the logistic and
other problems associated with governing a vast country such
as Nigeria. Later, Nigerians came to realize that the division
of the country further on socio-cultural boundaries reduced
the fears of domination by larger ethnic groups.
5.4. The Macpherson Constitution - Deepen­
ing Ethnic Differences.
Arthur Richard had envisaged that the Constitution would
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last for nine years but his successor, Sir John Macpherson,
appointed in ApIil1948, embarked on immediate constitutional
changes. The people were consulted on the new constitution
at every level: village, town and region. This procedure was
not adopted in framing the Richards Constitution. The three
years during which the new constitution was discussed were
dominated by ethnic and regional nationalism. The Northern
Peoples' Congress (NPC) representing the North, the Egbe
01110 Oduduwa (which metamorphosed into Action Group - AG)
the West, and the NCNC, while retaining its pan-Nigerian
stance, championed the cause of the East. Between October
10 and October 21, 1949, the drafting committee prepared
proposals for the committee of 53 members that would meet at
Ibadan. It proposed a fairly strong federal government with
however considerable powers delegated to the Regions.
Significant were the four minority reports submitted to the
Ibadan conference. These reports contained the difficulties
and disputes which have bedeviled Nigeria ever since. The
first minority report presented by the NCNC attacked the
regional basis of government, suggesting that the country be
divided into states on ethnic grounds. In a second report the
Party advocated universal adult suffrage, opposing the
creation of the House of Chiefs. A third report again backed
by the NCNC opposed the denial of franchise to southerners
resident in the North as espoused by the NPC. The 4th report
supported by the AG opposed the separation of Lagos from
the Western Region.
19
In January 1952, the new constitution - Macpherson's -
came into effect, with a centrallegisiature of 148 members,
half of them from the North, and an executive council of 18
members, comprising 6 officials and 12 ministers, four
nominated by each regional assembly. Each regional assembly
had its own executive council with a majority of Nigerian over
official members.
In the election that preceded the adoption of the Constitu­
tion, the NPC cleared all the seats in the North, NCNC had a
large majority in the East while AG secured a majority in the
West, essentially through members of the NCNC who had
crossed carpet. Because of the lack of discipline on the part
of the NCNC members elected into the Western House of
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Assembly, Zik lost the bid to go to the centre, although he
had been elected as one of the 5 candidates into the Western
House of Assembly to represent Lagos. The failure of the
Constitution was mainly because of party antagonisms. The
NCNC had suffered a disappointment and setback because of
the exclusion of its leader from the national legislature . Crisis
rocked the party as it expelled the ministers serving at the
central and regional levels who supported the new constitu­
tion. In addition, Anthony Enahoro, an Action Group member
of the national legislature had introduced a private member's
Bill demanding self-government for the country in 1956. This
was opposed by the NPC. It caused a lot of bad blood between
the politicians from the North and those from the South. The
two Houses of the Northern Assembly demanded the dissolU­
tion of the Federation. There were riots in the North,
precisely in Kano, in which many people were either killed or
wounded. Most of the casualties were easterners. 20
5.5. The I ssue of F.ederal ism.
The unsuccessful application of the Macpherson Constitu­
tion led to the London conference of 1953. The various
political parties which sent delegates to the conference
adopted positions that put the federation in jeopardy. The
NPC wanted a loose federation. The NCNC and AG proposed
a Southern Federation if the NPC continued to oppose the
question of self-government in 1956. At the end of the day,
the three major parties demonstrated a high level of patriotism
in order to preserve the Federation. They agreed that
residual powers should be transferred to the regions as had
been the case under the old constitution. Much wider powers
were given to the centre than had been anticipated by the
NPC. The issue of self-government was resolved by allowing
those regions that wanted it in 1956 to have it. The North was
thus left to choose a later date for self-government within the
framework of the target for independence for the whole
country. On the sensitive issue of the status of Lagos, the
NCNC and NPC demanded that Lagos should remain the
Federal Capital while the AG felt that Lagos naturally be-
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longed tothe Western Region. The British government sup­
ported the view that Lagos should be a federal territory.
When, however, the conference resumed in Lagos in January
1954, the AG did not raise the issue of Lagos, instead it
proposed that the right to succession be included in the new
constitution. ,This was rejected.
21
These two conferences held in London and Lagos produced
the basic Constitution under which Nigeria achieved indepen­
dence in 1960. The Constitution provided a federation of
three regions and a Federal Capital territory of Lagos. It
further provided for a national legislature of 184 members,
half of them were to rep_resent the northern region. The
appointment of ministers of the federal government was
removed from the whims and caprices of regional assem­
blies.22 The appointment of federal ministers became the
responsibility of the leader of the party that had majority of
seats in the House of Representatives. Sach region would
have a premier who also was the leader of the party in power
in the region. In the federal election held in 1954, the NPC
secured 79 seats, all in the North; the NCNC had 61 spread
mainly over the West and East and with one seat in the North;
the AG won 20 seats mainly in the west. In fact, the NCNC
secured more seats in the west than the AG. The NPC and the
NCNC formed the coalition government. The AG formed the
oppositior..' at the centre. 23
There was another constitutional conference in London in
1957 which ushered in independence in 1960. Each region sent
in 10 delegates and 5 advtsers, The federal government was
repCesented . by the Governor-General, regional Governors,
two .leading ministers and the leader of the opposition in the
Federal House. The capital territory had two delegates. The
West and East were to attain self-government in 1957 and the
North in 1959. The East was granted a House of Chiefs
already in vogue in the North and west. As stated above,
there were no major changes in the old constitution.
On September 2, 1957, Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa of
the NPC was appointed Nigeria's First Prtme Minister. The
quarrels among the parties and ethnic groups continued to
affect the stability of the country. The last election before
independence was held on December 12, 1959. The results of
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the election show that the AG secured 73 seats spread this
time over the whole country; the NCNC and its ally, the
Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU) won 8; the NPC
secured 134 seats all in the North. None of the three parties
secured a working majority. There were discussions and
activities behind the scene for the formation of another
coalition government. There were pressures for the NCNC
and AG to form a government, but such a government was
bound to endanger national unity, since that would mean a
bitter confrontation between the North and the South. The
NPC and NCNC went again into partnership and the AG
formed the official opposition. Dr. Azikiwe resigned his seat
in the House to become the President of the newly created
Senate, while Balewa continued as the Prime Minister. In
January 1960, the House of Representatives adopted a motion
of the Prime Minister asking for independence for the country
on October 1, 1960. On July 2, 1960, the British Parliament
passed the Nigerian Independence Act of 1960s.24 On Octo­
ber 1, 1960 Nigeria became independent and subsequently a
member of the Commonwealth.
6. Conclusion.
The path and process of aChieving independence in Nigeria
were certainly beset with difficulties right from the start.
Britain had imposed its rule on a vast territory with differeat
cultural, social and political background. It introduced
indirect rule in order to maximize its resources. The faithful
application of the system created difficulties. The white
officials were neither ready to go into partnership with
Nigerians nor to allow the people rule themselves. Eventually,
they .found that they could not permanently exclude the
educated elite from participation in the running of the affairs
of the country. Some of the events leading to constitutional
developments were due to both internal stimuli and external
circumstances. The two World Wars compelled the colonial
power to seek assistance and support for the prosecution of
the Wars. Nigerians responded positively but in expectation
of self-rule some day. Increasingly, Nigerians were getting
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education in Europe and America and were being exposed to
Western influence. There was a vibrant press to expose the
injustices inherent in the colonial administration. In time, the
British carne to recognize, if slowly, the necessity of leading
the country to independence. The political class was patriotic
enough to place the national unity and independence above
our cultural and ethnic divide. This lesson has not been as
evident since independence.
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The Legitimation Of Government In Africa
Charles U. Ilegbune
1. Introduction
In Africa today, a distinctly cacophonous wind of political
change is blowing. An increasing number of States is showing
a tendency towards democracy. At the same time, a specter of
authoritarianism remains prominent in some places. Still more,
even in the emerging democracies, the very character of the
democratization process in places conjures convulsive internal
upheavals. The prevailing scenario raises a fundamental issue
of stability of African governments. This, in turn, raises a
related and dominant socio-legal issue - that of governmental
legitimacy in Africa.
· Tt.e main questions canvassed in this paper may be grouped
into five, as follows: (i) What does it mean to say that a gov­
ernment is legitimate'? What, in other words, does the concept
of legitimacy connote in the grammar of law and politics? (ii)
How, from the legal, political, practical and economic per­
spectives, does a government acquire legitimacy? What, if
any, is the relationship between coercion and governmental
authority - is it possible to have an axiomatically legitimate
governmental authority flowing from the sheer exercise of
coercive power,? In other words, does legitimate governmental
authority flow exclusively from the exercise of democratic
franchise or the presumed consent of the governed i as
articulated in the American Declaration of Independence in
1776? (iii) When is a government said to have lost legitimacy?
What factors bring about the loss'? What are the usual socio­
legal indications of such loss? (iv) What inevitable results
flow from the loss of governmental legitimacy. (v) Finally,
what safeguards against initial lack , and subsequent loss, of
legitimacy can be prescribed for Africa.
2. Meaning of Government Legitimacy.
To begin with, the term "government" itself etymologically
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derives from the Latin word gubernaculum, which means the
helm from where the ship of the State is guided on its course
by the gubernator' or helmsman.
1
A modern and more
relevant definition of the term is given in the judgment of the
Supreme Court of Nigeria in Director of Public Prosecution v .
Chike Obi. 2 There, government is defined to mean "the body
of persons charged with the duty of directing or administer­
ing the affairs of a State; or the principal officers of a
State". The individuals constituting this body of persons may
change, but the body remains the center of gravity as the
body administering the State. The existence of a government
is a necessary condition for statehood. Indeed, it has long
been established that no State can today exist or be recog­
nized as a subject of international law without a government.
3
The claim of any government to the right to control, manage
and direct the ship of state is necessarily rooted in its claim
to legitimacy. The government must be, or assumed to be, or
even assume itself to be, a legitimate government. But what
does governmental legitimacy truly mean? The answer, it
seems, lies in the fact that theoretically the concept of
legitimacy operates at the level of the "ought" and not the
"is". When we say that a ,thing is legitimate, what we really
mean is that it accords with our pre-determined concept of
what ought to be. In other words, that it accords with an
accepted standard.
But, as we shall see, what "is" may differ very much from
what "ought" to be. A priest may in fact tell a lie. If he so
does, he "is" a liar, but that does not mean that he "ought"
to be a liar. Similarly, a government which had started with
a lawful origin may at a given time in fact not be legitimate.
No confusion should stem from the merger on occasions of the
"is" and the "ought". A priest who tells the truth "is" a
truthful person. A priest axiomatically "ought" to be a
truthful person. Thus, we see that legitimacy is an axiomatic
concept. It is value impregnated and necessarily has to be
SO.4
Having attempted to explain the theoretic basis of the
concept of legitimacy, it can now be postulated that a govern­
ment is legitimate if it is so circumstanced from the factors of
its legal origin and its in-office perlormance that it can claim
and enjoy uncoerced authority and receive habitual obedience
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and respect from the national population. If a· government is
legitimate in this sense, its temporary exile, while an aggres-
80r state is in military occupation, does not result in the
disappearance of its legitimacy. Thus, for example, during
the Second World War (1939-1945) the legitimate government
of Norway operated from exile durtng Nazi occupation and
continued to issue decrees, took part in international confer­
ences and signed agreements on behalf of Norway. 5 So, too,
did the legitimate government of Kuwait operate during the
Iraqi occupation (from August 2, 1990).
3. Acquisition and Retention of Legitima­
cy.
One of the most difficult socio-Iegal problems of our age is
the question of acquisition of legitimate governmental authori­
ty � Some of the issues which arise in a discussion of the
subject have already been identified at the introductory part
of this paper. To begin with, it should be noted that the issue
of aCquisition of legitimate 'governmental authority needs to be
distinguished from that of acquisition of governmental power •
Power is the ability to produce a result; to alter an existing
condition for better or for worse. Power is an "I-can" concept
and mayor may not be legitimate.
6
When, then, if at all, does mere political control or power
translate into legitimate governmental authority? Much
controversy over this issue has been occasioned by the
writings of the great German-Jew, Hans KeIsen. KeIsen was
strongly of the view that legitimate governmental authority
could be acquired through the instrumentality of coercive
revolution. According to him, upon the success of revolution
or political coup d'etat, which is accompanied with an effec­
tive control of the machinery of government, legit:lmacy
automatically ensures to the revolutionaries. He describes a
revolution as the overthrow of a pre-existing legal order
which totally sweeps away the legal norms of the immediate
past governmental edifice ••
7
Criticisms of KeIsen for this undiscrlm:inating endorsement
of violent Political revolutions have been numerous, persis­
tent and, it seems, well-merited.8 In the first place, such a
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view promotes adventurism. Secondly, it provides an excuse
for unconstitutional overthrow of even the most IKlPular
governments. Thirdly, it has been repeatedly demabstrated
that brute force alone (that is, one devoid of just::i:ftcation or
other extenuating circumstances and not followed ty acts of
popular welfare and justice) cannot 'confer or guarantee
governmental legitimacy . A recent case in point is'the effort
to return Haitian President, Jean-Bertrand AristicJe to power •.
Now, it seems to be generally agreed that, despite its
obviously numerous shortcomings in terms of qualitative
appltcatton ," democracy is the basic norm of political relations
in contemporary human society. Indeed in some African
countries the practice of democracy is made a constitutional
provision.10 Thus, the norm of democracy shoul.d of necessi­
ty impregnate our conception of legitimacy in relation to the
exercise of poHtical or governmental authority. Empirical
evidence has shown that it so does. And so, what is the
character of this norm of democracy, this much-taunted right
to democratic governance? How shall we characterize a
particular political module as democratic? Or, is there a
democratic archetype of which reference must be madein the
assessment of each situation?
The origins of democratic governance is often traced to the
egalitarianism and universal adult male suffrage of the ancient
Greek city-states. In moderrr tames , however, the idea of
democracy has developed far ahead of Whatever notions its
Greek proponents might have had. The complexity of the
modern state and the sheer mass of its inhabitants has made
the ortqmal idea of direct representation impossible in
practice, and indirect representation has bea>me the accepted
norm.
According to Roger Saltau,
11
Delocracy is a political systel under which there is universal
suffrage, regular elections honestly conducted, a nUlber of
political parties, freedol of speech and writing, toleration of
linorities and a cOlpetent independent judiciary. '0 us delocracr
is the antithesis of dictatorship.
Sir Ivor Jennings12 has also listed what he considers the
essentials of democracy to be as follows: (a) the right to vote
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freely and secretly; (b) representation in parliament; (c) the
rule of law (rather than rule by law);
13
(d) governmental
responsibility.
A Nigerian political scientist, Chief Arthur Nwankwo, has
strongly criticized European ideas of democracy (such as that
contained in the above definition of Saltau) as being too
fanciful for Africans. According to him, such ideas bear no
resemblance to the realities of the African condition. 14 Chief
Nwankwo has probably spoken in nationalist hyperbolic
terms, but his view is helpful in drawing attention to the
generally accepted view that democracies can, and should,
differ profoundly in their local application without losing the
essential character of the system.
15
The essential point of democracy, however structurally
different its local applications may be, is that it is a system of
government adapted to secure the best possible form of
participatory governance for the national population. This is
probably why, in the politically-charged climate of the United
Nations General Assembly, democracy has been equated with
the existence of periodic election ;" and most current re­
search on the subject also concentrates on election.
17
The ballot is an objective fact which provides a simple litmus
test for indirect citizen participation in governance. It is, in
other words, the best possible characterization of the
corporate will of the voters - the so-called "consent of the
governed", This must be assumed to be so even though,
admittedly, there are two powerful arguments against the
efficacy of the ballot. The first is that there are certain
structural conditions necessary for the effective use of the
ballot which are profoundly lacking in most African countries.
These conditions include literacy, the availability of informa­
tion, personal security of candidates and voters, the exercise
of free speech, rule of law, low degree (if not absence) of
electoral corruption, and adequate resources for the media's
use.
The second argument, as Barsh pointed out,
18 is that there
are many ways of exercising power in modern society which
may often counteract the result of the ballot: e.g. the power
of the mass media and, by implication, of the groups with
wealth to use it freely; the dominant role of technocrats,
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military elites, business tycoons and, very significantly for
Africa, widespread rigging. The last of these devices was
recently addressed in Nigeria - with varying degrees of
success - by the introduction of, first, the Open Ballot
System (OBS) and, secondly, the Modified Open Ballot System
(MOBS). The MOBS' first experimentation in Nigeria (locally
called Option A4)19 - although initially widely regarded with
extreme skepticism and hostility - turned out to produce what
has been considered nationally and internationally as the
freest and most peaceful election in Nigeria's history since
independence in 1960.20
Notwithstanding these criticisms, however, and until a
better electoral system is invented, the ballot must be taken
to be what it is contrived to be - a concrete manifestation of
the "fr�e' choice of the electorate as to who would govern
them; a way, in other words, by which the electoral popula­
tion expresses its will or consent to be governed.
This being the case, it can be asserted that the irreducible
minimum condition required for exercising legitimate govern­
mental authority is the consent of the governed. The ballot,
as cast in periodic election in a democratic set-up, is one way
- the primary and fundamental way - of expressing that
consent. Invariably, the requirements and conditions for
election - who can vote and be voted for, the establishment,
organization and administration of political parties, etc - are
all provided for in the constitution,
21
which, itself, has been
judicially recognized as deriving from the "will" of the people
and as being the grundnorm - the fons et odgo of the laws
and rights of the people.22 Any government formed as a
result of winning an election properly conducted within the
provisions of the constitution thereby acquires a mandate or
legitimacy to govern. Thus, it is constitutionally declared in
Nigeria that, "Sovereignty belongs to the people of Nigeria
from whom Government through this Constitution derives all
its powers and authority".
23 But on the contrary, any
government which comes into power otherwise than on the
basis of an electoral success within the provision of the
constitution potentially lacks legitimacy. This is probably the
basis of Professor S.A. Aluko's oft-repeated statement that
"No military government has any legitimacy" .
24 The Nigerian
Constitution 1989 contains an explicit provision to this same
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effect. It provides in section 1 (2) as follows:
'!he Federal Republic of Nigeria shall not be governed, nor shall
any person or group-of persons take control of the Governlent of
Nigeria or any part thereof, except in accordance with the
provisions of this Constitution'.
But, as already indicated, such a government's lack of
legitimacy is only potential. As a matter of fact, a government
formed through extra-constitutional seizure of power, such
as successful military coup d'etat or a successful mass
uprising against tyranny, may well be legitimate or may
acquire legitimacy. To do so, the emergent government must -
(a) be de facto effective, in the sense of its having completely
liquidated the former government and been in control; (b)
have a popular appeal, in the sense of its being widely and
demonstrably acclaimed and welcomed at inception bX a great
majority of people; (c) administer the country with justice
and on benevolent, populist and welfarist principles; (d)
cater equitably for all sections of the constituent commnntttes:
and (e) be accountable and responsive to the people.
The fact that an extra-constitutional government may thus
acquire legitimacy seriously detracts from the value of the
kind of corlstitutional provision made in Nigeria, prohibiting
such government. To a large extent, it is the crass mis­
governance of the erstwhile government overthrown in an
extra-constitutional revolt that provides the leverage for the
popularity and consequent legitimization of the succeeding
government. This is the reason why military intervention in
governance has sometimes been justified on the basis of grave
necessity and the self-preservation of the country in the face
of mismanagement and mis-governance by the legitimate civil
authority and the near-collapse of the economy - the so-called
"custodian theory" of military intervention.
25
The major problem with coups and revolts, however, and the
reason why they must be discouraged even if the prevailing
social, economic and political climate favours them - is that
they prevent or otherwise impede the learning process of the
political class, without which there will ultimately be no
healthy political culture or stability. Moreover, there is no
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basis for the pretension inherent in the action of the coup
plotters that they know what is best for the state and people
and are their self-appointed messiah.
Coming now to the question of retention of legitimacy, it
should be noted that the same conditions required for the
acquisition of legitimate authority at the outset apply to its
retention. Accordingly, a legitimate government retains its
legiQrnacyonly so long as, by remaining effective and acting
justly and fairly in the ways already stated, it assures to
itself the willing support and consent of the governed.
3. Loss of Legitimacy
Governmental legitimacy is not a once-and-for-aIl attribute.
Just as it is something which can be acquired, so too it can be
lost. The question here is: what factors bring about the loss
of legitimacy? What are the usual socio-political indications of
such loss?
The answer, simply put, seems to be that a government
loses its legitimacy (or right to the obedience of the gov­
erned) if, on a rational and objective assessment of its
performance, it can be said to have ceased to serve the very
object for which governments are established. That object has
been tersely stated by LOrd Beveridge as follows:
The object of governJent in peace and in war is not the glory of
rulers or of races, but the happiness of the CODon lan.26
In almost all African countries, this fundamental object of
government has been expanded and re-stated in a constitu­
tional provision. Thus, in the Nigerian Constitution 1989, it
is enacted in section 15 (2) (b) as follows:
.•• the security and welfare of the people shall be the prilary
purpose and responsibility of governaent.
These objects of government - the happiness, security and
welfare of the people - can only be achieved by a governmont
which satisfies the requirements of what has been called
"good governance" - a dependable barometer for measuring
the economic and political virility of governments and of the
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propriety of their actions and policies.
The concept of "good governance" has been explained in
various ways and from different perspectives. For the
purposes of African nations the dominant perspectives are
those of European donor countries and those, even in Africa,
concerned to see "humane governance" enthroned in the
culture of African governments. Thus, for a donor agency
like the World Bank, "good governance" for African nations
means "a public service that is efficient, a judicial system that
is reliable, and an administration that is accountable to the
public. ,,27 Again, from the British viewpoint, "good gover­
nance" for a third world country seeking to qualify for aid
must include the following: (i) respect for human rights and
the rule of law; (il) movement towards democratic and
accountable government and rooting out of corruption; (iii)
the pursuit of sound social and economic policies.
28
But perhaps the most comprehensive and incisive demands
of "good governance" from the standpoint of social, political
and economic policies of African governments is that of
Africa's own Professor Mazrui. For him, "good governance"
means "humane governance" and the indications of compliance
with the requirement must depend on answers to the following
twelve
_ searChing questions, namely: ( 1) How many political
detainees does a country have? (2) How many prisoners have
been convicted of political offences (including possession of
subversive literature)? (3) How many journalists have been
imprisoned or murdered in the last five years? (4) How many
competitive elections have taken place in the last ten years?
(5) How many years has the Head of State been in power?
(6) What is the ratio of expenditures on the military as
compared with expenditures on education, health and other
social services? (7) How often have Universities been closed
down for political reasons? (8) What proportion of students in
Universities and schools are women or girls? (9) What propor­
tion of agricultural land is owned by women? (10) How many
unarmed political demonstrators have been killed or maimed by
police in the last five years? (11) How many police officers or
other security officials have been disciplined for offences
against civilians in the last ten years? (12) How many poli­
ticians or civil servants have been tried and convicted for
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corruption in the last ten years?29
It is clear that many African governments, past and pres­
ent, will fail on the scoreboard of these questions. Without
doubt, the political, civil and social strife and, in some cases
open war, which have raged or are currently raging in such
African countries as Nigeria, Liberia, Benin, Zaire, South
Africa, Togo, Somalia and some others, have deep roots in the
abysmal failure of the present or erstwhile governments of
these countries to fulfil the requirements of good governance.
In all those countries and more, it has been a dreary story of
racial disenfranchisement, political repression and persecu­
tion of opponents, massive corruption, press gagging,
resource squander-mania, dictatorship, ethnic persecution,
abuse of human rights, subversion of electoral mandate,
contempt for the judiciary and the rule of law, "sit-tightism"
and rule by law. These are the usual signs and manifestations
of declining or lost legitimacy.
If, as has been contended in this paper, the consent of the
governed - deriving from the ballot and/or the welfarist and
just policies of government - is the basis of governmental
legitimacy, it will be futile and indeed preposterous to
presume the continued existence of that consent or will in
favour of the governments involved in the above-listed acts.
Hence, it would seem right, and even compelling, to conclude
that the governments concerned have lost their legitimacy.
One reason, however, why many African governments are
unable to design or implement meaningful welfarist or democ­
ratization programmes needs to be poirited out. It has to do
with the general national poverty of many African countries.
There is no doubt a consistent relationship between national
poverty and the level of welfarism and democratization. The
very parlous state of the economy in many African countries
today would not enable governments to sustain an acceptable
level of welfarism and democratization. Quite apart from
endemic corruption (for which African governments have no
excuse) , there is an external factor in the economic situation.
Africa's foreign indebtedness today stands at nearly 400
billion US dollars, while debt servicing alone takes over 30
billion annually.
30 This utterly dismal pictures once moved
Justice C. A. Oputa, formerly of the Supreme Court of
Nigeria, to lament that "the tragedy of many African coun-
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tries is the monster of global structural injusticen31 which,
according to Dr. E. K. Ouashigah,32 "continues to choke
many African nations pushing them deeper and deeper into
economic doldrums H •
4. Consequences of the Loss of Legitimacy.
Four principal consequences, one political and three legal,
flow from the loss of governmental legitimacy. The conse­
quences may be identified and explained as follows:
(1) Political insecurl.ty. A government which lacks legitimacy
becomes and feels politically insecure. That being the case,
it becomes also politically temperamental and irritable in an
attempt to cover its inadequacy and clothes itself with a
superficial garb of authority. At the least pretext, it bran­
dishes naked authority. In that way, the government sinks
deeper and deeper into dictatorship and insensitivity and
becomes liable to intensify those acts, as enumerated above,
associated with loss of legitimacy, such as repression and
persecution of political opponents and critics, abuse of human
rights, contempt for the judiciary, etc. Ironically, by getting
more involved in these acts of repression, the illegitimate
government quickens its own demise, for the acts in tum
provoke soc:ial and political agitation from the people. It is a
veritable illustration of the biblical warning that "no one can
escape from the consequences of his ain",
33
(2) Loss of right to govern. A government which lacks
legitimacy thereby loses the legal right to govern. Its laws,
strictly speaking, have no binding force. But since such a
government is in de facto control of all the state apparatus of
force, including the army and police, it is akin to a group of
armed bandits who seize control of an assembly of persons.
Such an armed group will of course be able to command
obedience from the assembly because the people are obliged
to obey the bandits out of fear or by force of arms and not
because they are obligated - or duty bound - to obey them.
34
This view may, of course, find no favour with adherents of
traditional legal positivism.
35 But in the nec-naturalist
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posture we have adopted, the laws made by an illegitimate
regime, even de facto in control, will have no strict force of
law36 because such a regime has no right to obedience. What,
after all, is law but an instrumentality for harnessing the
right of the law-giver to obedience of the citizens and a
corresponding duty of its citizens to obey that law? According
to Professor Bodenheimer: 37
A statute or decree lay cease to be valid where the contrast
between positive law and justice becoles so unbearable that the
positive law being false lust yield to justice.
(3) CitiDms are absolved from duty of obedience. As earlier
pointed out,' one attribute of legitimacy on the part of the
government is that its citizens owe to it a duty of habitual
obedience. A corollary of the government becoming illegiti­
mate and thereby losing the right to govern is that citizens of
the state become absolved from the duty of obedience.
Obedience, if and to the extent it continues, is due more to
habit, fear or compulsion than to obligation.
( 4) Citipms acquire right and duty to change the govern­
ment. An illegitimate government, being emptied 0' any right
to gove�, is technically a usurper, holding the citizens to
ransom. This being the case, the citizens have a right,
indeed a duty, to remove the government. To refer again to
the immortal words of the American Declaration of Indepen­
dence: whenever any government becomes destructive of the
very ends for which it is established - thus (as we argued)
becoming illegitimate - "it is the right of the people to alter or
abolish it and institute a new government". Civilian and
military revolts, founded on this principle, to remove dictato­
rtal, sit-tight and illegitimate regimes have been rampant in
African countries, including Uganda, Angola, Liberia,
Somalia, South Mrica, and so on.
Also recently in Nigeria, a former Head of State I General
Olusegun Obasanjo, leading a new Association - the Associa­
tion for Democracy and Good Governance of Nigeria (ADGN) -
publicly joined other Nigerians in declaring the eight-years
sit-tight military regime of General Ibrahim 8abangida
illegitimate, and called on all Nigerians to :remove the regime
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through "a coup, massive protests and civil disobedience
throughout the country. 1138 The adverse social. and economic
implications of governments allowing situations of this kind to
arise should be clear to future leaders in Africa.
5. Conclusion: Safeguards Against Govern­
mental Illegitimacy.
It has been urged in this paper there exists a right of
African peoples to democracy and legitimate government. This
is a right, not a privilege, guaranteed in international law.
Indeed as most contemporary international lawyers know
today, the right to democracy flOwing from the right of self­
determination of peoples, is no longer a question of domestic
jurisdiction of states since its inclusion in several internation­
al legal conventions and treaties has taken it out from the
internal affairs of states and placed it on the international
plane. The domestic jurisdiction of a state is the sum total of
matters left over from those which have been transferred to
the international plane by states in exercise of their sover­
eign power to make treaties.
39
Thus, we are of the view that
African peoples, and indeed all other peoples, have a right to
legitimate their governments if necessary by appropriate mass
resistance and the use of at least defensive force. Professor
Dunn has articulated the philosophical basis of such a stand
thus:
To assert ... that The Revolutions of Government are not the
subjects duty but God's prerogative' was simple function of
power ... The Greek Christi�ns (and all peoples) have a continuing
right of resistance to their Turkish masters (and all other
illegitimate governments). They have never chosen the framework
under which they live ....
4o
The right of the people voluntarily to take up arms in
assertion of political freedom and government is a long
established principle of both municipal. systems and the
international legal regime.
41
Lastly, we wish to state in passing that the practice of most
States have in the recent past tended to lean in favour of
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concern for the human rights record of other states based on
the removal of the issue of human and group fundamental
rights to the international domain.
42
Accordingly, the
international community ought to employ every mechanism at
its disposal both as aid and enforcement, to ensure that
African dictators and sit-tight leaders are thrown out of
office by the popular will.
43
We commend the recent United Nation's effort in Liberia,
Togo, Somalia and even far away Cambodia. This is the age of
our being our brother's keeper and this is the age of freedom
guaranteed by collective security, and thus the collective
will.
It is only hoped that African tyrants a.nd illegitimate
governments will hearken to the voices of freedom rising in
pitch each moment and give way to popular participation in
government as specifically guaranteed by Article 13 of the
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights to which most
countries are signatory, and have ratified. The beneficial
implications for such change will, as we have shown, be
tremendous. In this connection it is hoped that the Organiza­
tion of African Unity will rise up to the demands of contempo­
rary international relations and act appropriately on occasions
in defence of human rights and democracy so that Africa will
avoid another Somalia or Liberia.
There is perhaps no better way to end this paper than to
refer with respect to the call by the former Zimbabwean
President, Canaan Banana, on the Organization of Africa
Unity at its recent Cairo Summit, to bar dictators from the
Summit. According to him, the Organization's objective of
achieving an enduring peace among states would be unattain­
able unless such a policy is enforced. He declared:
The recipe for durable peace in the continent resides in the
establishment of unfettered freedom and democratic culture. We
have as an organization to rid Africa of the notorious dictators
that have held the majority of the people on the continent to
ransom on account of unbridled political ambition.
This is where the present writer stands.
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REVIEWS AND REVIEW ARTICLES.
1. For Sovereign National Conferences in post-colonial Africa:
A Review Article of,
F. Eboussi Boulaga's, Les Conferences Nationales
en Afrique noire. Une Affaire a Suivre. Paris:
Karthala, 1993.
A Sovereign national conference to examine the national
question! This is the clarion call of human rights groups and
other concerned groups and individuals in Nigeria. The
former military president, Ibrahim Babangida, thou.ght that
such a conference would be an exercise in futility. According
to him, the two hou.ses of the national assembly, which were
recently disbanded by the new military rulers, were already
discussing the crucial issues affecting the nation. However,
the call became louder after the Babangida deceit and with the
return of the military under Sani Abacha. The Abacha junta
played into the hands of the supporters of the national
conference, or wished to mollify them, by calling for a
"constrtutional conference" . If such a conference takes place,
it will be the third under military dictatorship (1979, 1989,
1994). It appears to be the thinking of the new regime that a
constitutional conference will be more effective than the
national conference. But a "sovereign national conference"
may, from experience, be very much different from a consti­
tutional conference. This may become clear in this review
article.
In his book, Les Conferences nationales en Afrique noire,
Eboussi Boulaga treats the issue at length. The book was
prompted by the national conferences held in Franco-phone
Western and Central Africa (Mali, Niger, Togo, Benin
Republic, Congo and Zaire). The on-going crisis in some of
these countries shows that holding a conference is not like
Swishing a magic "land. However, the experience in itself,
Eboussi argues, must be recorded and its potentialities for
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renascent Africa entrenched in the political culture of Africa
as we make the difficult journey towards nation-hood in the
modern world.
The book is divided. into two parts. In the first part,
Eboussi chronicles, in the style of the journalist, the origin
of this novelty, the "sovereign national conference n , in Benin
republic. The Benin assembly appears in many ways to be a
rebirth of traditional African pattern of dialogue (African
palaver). In the second section he takes the reader through
a Hphilosophical trip", in order to situate the foundations of
the national conferences which had taken place in Mali, Niger,
Benin, Togo, Congo and Zaire. It is in this philosophical
meditation that Eboussi teases out the root causes of the
unparalleled cruelty and State terror that characterize post­
colonial Africa, and the salvific lessons to be drawn from the
national coriferences. In an appendix the editors incorporated
some texts of the resolutions of the national conferences.
1. The Experience of Benin Republic.
The immediate motivators of the national conference in
Benin are the mass of people who have seen through the
phoney of Marxism copied from Albania: civil service employ­
ees whose salary arrears remained unpaid, students demand­
ing bursaries that are unremitted, teachers, and trade unions
established by government. These and many more who were
paying the heavy prize for the economic indiscipline of the
ruling class trooped into the streets, defied bans on assem­
blies and demonstrations, and burnt effigies of their presi­
dent (Kerekou). There were other groups who made an
impact, directly or indirectly, on the convocation or the
realisation of the aims of the conference. Top on the list of
these are Beninois living in exile and religious leaders.
Beninois living abroad or in exile used their connections to
influence international finance houses to force Kerekou to
make concessions, democratize, and grant amnesty to all
exiles. Religious leaders, and religion itself, played a non­
negligible role in all the national conferences. With the
exception of Niger, all the other confer.ences were chaired by
catholic bishops. In Benin the chairmanship of the conference
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by the auxiliary bishop of Cotonou - Isidore de Souza - saved
the conference from certain disaster. In addition, the
insistent preaching in the churches on pardon, repentance
and reconciliation, especially in Benin and Congo, was the
crucial means of appeasing a people enraged by the revela­
tions of cruelty, brutality, murders, elimination of oppo­
nents, embezzlement of public funds etc., which emerged
during the sitting of the national conferences. According to
Eboussi, "People never prayed so much in Benin and Congo
as they did during the national conferences" (p. 50).
The anti-government uprising whose immediate cause was
the unbearable economic conditions testifies to the collapse of
the institutions of governance because of the loss of credibi­
lity. Kerekou could have followed the advise of the hawks -
hard-core communists - to crush the rebellion. But he
decided to "Invent" the "national conference" which would
assemble Beninois from all walks of life to discuss the national
question. The expression "national conference" came from
Kerekou himself (p. 66). In his opening address to the
conference, Kerekou insisted that the assembly was not a
tribunal nor should its convocation be interpreted in terms of
victor-vanquished. Rather, the conference should set up a
political platform for the emergence of a consensus on issues
affecting the nation.
What irked the assembled Beninois representing various
groups and segments of society [groups whose voice has been
more or less suppressed throughout the 17 years of Marxist
dictatorship], is how a government with such a stinking
record of decay, inhumanity, robbery of the treasury, etc.,
could behave as !f it is indispensable. Consequently the
preliminal, though crucial and radical, question was posed as
to the power of the national conference. Alexis Hountondji, a
medical practitioner with little political experience, proposed
the motion to the assembled delegates, "The national confer­
ence proclaims its sovereignty and the supremacy of its
decisions" (p. 72). The statement was not part of the stand­
ing order. The debate was stormy. Supporters of the old
regime attacked the motion ferociously. Then, Kerekou
himself decided to appear before the assembly to answer its
questions: there was no question of his government resign-
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ing; but the cabinet could be reshuffled. Besides, what did
a person like Nicephore Saglo do as World Bank administrator
to help shore up the economy of Benin which he now feels
justified to sit in the conference and judge as a wreckage? It
was the critical and opportune time for 8og10, thrown into the
limelight by the president's outbursts, to score a major
political gain. His response to the president's attack was
respectful, moderate, but forceful. He had warned Kerekou
about the on-coming economic disaster; had given his advice,
but it was not heeded!
The ttmely intervention of Mgr Isidore de Souza with the
president, saved the conference, and brought it toa success­
ful end. A vote was taken on the issue of the sovereignty of
the national conference. There were 370 delegates in favour
and 17 against. The sovereignty of the conference was to
ensure that action followed discourse. At the conclusion of
the conference which had been sitting for twelve days, the
resolutions were presented to the president. Kerekou,
finally, declared his commitment to carry out the resolutions
of the conference on February 28 1990. On August 1, 1991,
Nicephore 8og10 took the oath of office as the elected presi­
dent of the republic.
2. Foundational Questions About the Sover­
eign National Conference.
Eboussi felt the need for a philosophical reflection on the
national conference and the issues raised during its sitting so
that such a momentous event may not be r�duced to the banal,
to mere prattle. In words drawn from the world of symbolism
he describes the conference as the "revelation of a new spirit,
a flashing flare, a luminous signal that the future projects".
Consequently, it harbours amazing possibilities for interpret­
ing or unveiling our history (p. �). The memory of cruelty
and inhumanity conjured during the sitting of the conference
is described in Marxian terms as the "expression of total
alienation and an equally radical protest against such an
alienation, its disclosure" (p. 20). Following the prevailing
mood of the conference, Eboussi's philosophical meditation on
the conference is from the under-side of history: i.e. the
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poor I the silenced beasts of burden I the sufferers of incredi­
ble human cruelty I those who bore the burden of the State.
They are the "radical witness" of a history of unjust, useless
and enormous human suffering stretching from the period of
slavery through colonialism to the post-colonial period. The
reality of a terrible past of which we are accomplices.
The shocking revelations of cruelty during the sitting of
the national conferences make one to reflect on the enormity
of "man-made" evil in sub-saharan Africa and to wonder at
the insensitivity of the African elite to this evil situation. Why
is it that the ruling class has to be coaxed and cajoled,
pressurized and threatened to respect the human dignity of
fellow Africans (fellow human beings)? What controlling
ideology undergirds the exercise of power in post-colonial
Africa to yield this dividend of inhumanity? To answer this
question, according to Eboussi I is to get to the roots of the
pathological abuse of power and the cultivation of a State of
violence. Eboussi unveils the roots of the pathology in four
theorems, and then shows how the national conference is the
antithesis of the prevailing ideology. (a) African indepen­
dence was a ratification and renewal of a situation of heteron­
omy. Ethnic groups were artificially linked. There was no
mutual and creative encounter between the groups. Their
medium of encounter was their master's language, interests,
and values. Unity became weakness. (b) The idealized
heteronomy transforms the colonies into ideological States.
The emergent States are not living organisms because the
history and traditions of African societies are despised as
archaisms. Western patterns of government took flesh
miraculously (through incarnation or transubstantiation). in
Africa. (c) The emergent fetish State which is out of touch
with Mrican reality is structural falsehood and murderous
violence. The State defines itself without and against the
people. A deep misunderstanding reigns, leading to the
destruction of the very basis of human and political life: a
distortion of language or speech, taboo or law, resulting in
loss of trust or credibility. ( d) Consequently, the fetish
State is a return to the state of nature. In the situation of
domination by the privileged few and the servitude of the
majority, barbarism reigns supreme: the rulers ratify and
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renew slavery and colonization through their actions. The
army is effectively used against the society. With the deper­
sonalization of humans in Africa, any level of social or
political evil is taken to be normal. Such an enthronement of
structural evil makes the fetish State irreformable. Only a
revolution like the sovereign national conference may estab­
lish a new beginning.
The institutional crisis of the African State underlines the
objective of the sovereign national conference. Eboussi
defines its aim as "establishing individuals and heterogenous
groups, [artifidally] tied together by a monstrous system,
into one community of destiny articulated in the form of word
and freedom" (pp. 126-127). The realisation of this objective
of the national conference would move Africa out of the jungle
of idolatry ("statolatry" ), falsehood, robbery and murder. It
is a restoration of language and word as means of communica­
tion, a reestablishment of credibility and belief in political
institutions. In the symbolic language of myth and ritual, the
narrative of the negative experiences and its ritualization by
the assembled national conference is, according to Eboussi,
a victory over idolatry, falsehood, etc. As a beginning, a new
beginning, the national conference realises within itself its
very objective. The following models, derived from the
science of anthropology, may demarcate any national confer­
ence which may be held or may have been held in Africa:
festivity - it is a festival of new found liberty; play - every
beginning contains the ludic element; as play the conference
is its own end; therapy - the conference is a ritual which
symbolically names the malady in order to heal the whole body
and save it from instant death; palaver - it is the reemergence
of the African pattern of dialogue where all have the right to
speak; in this way communal problems are resolved and the
communal meal ritualizes the reestablished harmony; initiation
- the conference is a ritual passage through which the
generation gap is bridged, the society is rebuilt on the
ancestral foundations, individuals are transformed [through
a process of healing and expiation as in the Beti So ritual] ,
illusions are banished and each member of the society assumes
his or her responsibility.
The story of the national conferences held in Africa is not
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recounted simply to inform. Rather it brings out salient
factors or attitudes which constitute Africa, attitudes or
values which are foundational to the nature of the African,
the cultural matrix which must be taken on board as Africa
dialogues with modernity. The sovereign national conference
shows us the way to modernize without losing our identity:
"The actualization of our culture makes us subjects and
agents of the universal civilization of which science and
technology are the form and necessary condition" (p. 169).
In the national conference the core of a civilization, as de­
scribed in the myth-ritual and ethical characteristics, become
active and creative; and the creative encounter of diverse
cultures is' shown to be possible. Consequently, as Eboussi
concludes, the national conference is a project to be contin­
ued.
3. Concluding Reflections.
The convocation and assembling of national conferences are
not only good for post-colOnial Africa but have been shown to
be an imperious necessity. The national conference is not
seditious. Incumbent governments, no matter how unpopular,
are responsible for their convocation. The greatest benefit
derived from the national conference is the establishment of
the foundations for the emergence of civil society; a society
to which the State is subject and which is served by the
State. The emergence of such a society where harmony and
consensus may reign must be the result of frank dialogue.
Problems which beset us must be off-loaded through free
speech and just action. As the Mrican native wisdom insists,
one either speaks or dies.
In Nigeria, the military and opportunistic political class, do
not see government as under civil society, rather gove;rnment
must hold civil society hostage. Instead of a state of law to
protect humane living, we have a state of barbarism where
monstrous decrees protect the ruling military elite. In Nigeria
the military are scared of a national conference to discuss the
national question because such a conference forebodes �e
erosion of the privileges of the few over against the dominated
majority. Some believe that to discuss the national question or
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to reevaluate federalism may lead to the disintegration of the
nation along ethnic or tribal lines. But they overlook the
gross injustice of one or two ethnic groups taking others
hostage through the monopoly of State or economic power.
Our cohabitation has not been based on core values, mutual
interests and objectives emanating from frank dialogue where
the freedom of each group is respected.
The time is ripe for all segments of the Nigerian society, all
regions and ethnic groups, all associations - religious,
professional or otherwise - to assemble and discuss the
national question, in order to lay the firm foundation for the
emergence of a Nigerian nation. Eboussi has shown us in his
book that such a conference, whose agenda must vary in
accordance with the divergent situations and histories of the
amalgamated societies, has the potentialities of carrying
Africa forward. Those who oppose it, and deny the voice of
the majority because they hold military power I are the real
enemies of progress. Progress in Nigeria and in post-colonial
Africa must be built upon the firm foundations of truthfulness
and liberty.
Elochukwu E. Uzukwu.
2. Olusegun Obasanjo and Akin Mabogunje (editors) I Ele­
ments of Democracy. Abeokuta, Nigeria: ALF Publica­
tions, 1992, xi+212 pages.
General Obasanjo's farm is useful to Nigeria for at least two
reasons. First, it helps feed a hungry nation. Second, it
provides a haven for creative thinking in the service of the
nation. Elements of Democracy is a fruit of such a creative
thinking. It is the outcome of a number of dialogues, by
intellectuals of international fame, on democracy. These
dialogues took place when Nigerians were trying to make
sense of Babangida's program for transition to democracy.
The circumstances of the time dictated the topics discussed
by the participants in the Farm House Dialogue; informed the
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conclusions they reached, and determined the recommenda­
tions they made to the government. Their overrtding concern
is to secure a stable democracy in Nigeria. This concern is the
guiding thread of the arguments of the book. It makes it
easier to appreciate the many recommendations by the book.
The book contains eleven chapters, a detailed and very
useful index, and a complete list of the names and addresses
of the participants in the Democracy Dialogue. The contents
of the eleven chapters form a very good analysis of the
dynamics of a, once-colonized African nation struggling to
define its identity, and to articulate a vision of its future,
using the ideal of democracy as a guide. While maintaining
that democracy is the way out, the book insists that democra­
cy as defined by the West is not for Nigeria .given: the
prevailing level of poverty and illiteracy; the resilience of
traditional institutions; the dominant presence of an over­
politicized military which has subjected the nation to so many
years of government by decrees with its attendant flagrant
abuse of human rights; and the peculiar nature of Nigeria as
a multi-national nation characterized by religious pluralism.
It is clear from the book that the Nigerian terrain is an
over-determined one. Any meaningful project of building a
political democracy in it must take into account the insights
gained from a thorough analysis of this terrain.
For at least three reasons, the book will outlive the
establishment of a viable democracy in Nigeria. First, future
historians will always find it a useful reference material in
their bid to reconstruct the period in Nigerian history when
a starving nation was ruled by decrees by an over-politicized
military which lacked the will to effect a change in the
direction of greater freedom for all. Second, the penetrating
and insightful analysis of the different forces at work in
Nigeria will always make it easier to appreciate the difficulties
involved in governing a complex nation. Third, its insistent
demand for an African-styled democracy will always be seen
as prophetic. Its warning is unmistakable: to be rooted in its
traditional values is the most effective way of securing a
nation's identity in the family of nations. For these reasons
and more, the book is destined to reward any reading, no
matter how casual.
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To be more rewarding, however, a number of issues raised
in the book needs to be fine-tuned by a future edition. Four
of these come readily to mind.
First, a future edition should tidy up the concept of
African democracy. Present attempts to define "democracy"
in the book are, at best, only restatements of some of the
very many definitions available in the West (see pp. 2, 12,
118). It is not enough to insist that Western-styled democracy
is not for Africa (pp. 30, 40,
98 and 179 for example). A coherent concept of African
democracy is necessary to guard against the concept becoming
so fuzzy that forms of government like gerontocracy qualify
for membership in a summit of democraCies.
Second, the book urges a radical transformation of the
electoral attitude C)f the populace (p. 7). This transformation
is seen as necessary for establishing democracy in Nigeria.
But if the Nigerian situation is as corrupt as the analysis
leads one to believe, the reader needs to be told how the
transformation will hopefully be effected. Who, for example,
is the subject of this transformation process? The corrupt
military? The inexperienced pOliticians who exploit ethnic and
religious sentiments for their selfish ends? This is the thorny
question Karl Marx raised years ago: Who educates the
educator?
Third, a future edition should reproduce, in the interest
of the readers, a good chunk of the arguments of the Dia­
logue. Most of what we have in the book (apart from the
papers presented by some of the participants) are conclusions
reached by the participants and recommendations made by
them. This explains the copious use of such expressions as:
"The Dialogue noted", "The Dialogue agreed", "The Dialogue
observed", etc.
Fourth, a future edition should examine more critically the
link between human nature and democracy. In its present
form, the link is simply asserted, not argued (p. 106). It will
be interesting to know which of the many theories of human
nature should ground the theory and practice of democracy
in the African context.
In spite of these and similar gaps to be filled by a future
edition, Elements of Democracy remains a significant contIi-
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bution to the project of building a stable democracy in
Nigeria. It is a book that has to be read by all interested in
moving countries like Nigeria in a direction that resounds
with more freedom for all.
Iwuchukwu Oliver. Spiritan School of Philosophy, lsienu­
Nsukka.
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